



Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral 
Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and 
Consistent Jurisprudence 
Jeffrey W. Stempel* 
 infatuate 1: to cause to be foolish: deprive of sound judgment  2: to 
inspire with a foolish or extravagant love or admiration.1 
 love 1a(1): a strong affection for another arising out of kinship or 
personal ties . . . (3): affection based on admiration, benevolence, or 
common interests . . . 2: warm attachment, enthusiasm, or 
devotion . . . 3a: the object of attachment, devotion, or admiration.2 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT KIND OF “LOVE” IS THIS? 
Collectively, the U.S. Supreme Court, even if not “in love” with 
arbitration, appears to at least have a serious attachment to arbitration, 
subject to revision only in the service of other questionable preferences, 
such as support for the comparatively richer and more powerful litigant.  
In that sense, the Court’s pronounced, but intellectually inconsistent, 
preferences for arbitration reflect a reckless, impure, or tainted love 
rather than the type of mature, realistic affection society generally sets 
forth as exemplary.3  The Court has an unrealistically sanguine view of 
the wonders of arbitration—so sanguine that it is willing in most cases to 
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 1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 597 (10th ed. 1996). 
 2. Id. at 690.  The dictionary definition of “love” has been edited to exclude, among other 
irrelevant definitions, “attraction based on sexual desire.”  See id. at 690. 
 3. A case can be made that in arbitration cases the Court is being dispassionately calculating in 
its result-orientation and disregard for its professed polestars of sound judicial decision-making.  If 
this is the case, then the Court’s performance in arbitration cases is even more contemptible in that it 
implies blatant misuse of judicial power rather than merely being led astray by arbitration’s overall 
popularity. 
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impose arbitration in situations far exceeding those envisioned by the 
drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act4 and despite significant issues of 
states’ rights, the quality of contract consent, the fairness of the 
arbitration tribunal, and the overall operation of the dispute resolution 
system.  But at crucial junctures, the Court strains to rein in arbitration 
when concerned that the arbitration might reach results the Court dislikes 
or come to resemble litigation—particularly aggregate litigation. 
During the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to 
arbitration disputes has been more than just mere affection for 
arbitration, but it has also lacked the nuanced understanding and realistic 
appraisal associated with true love.  Rather, the Court’s arbitration 
decisions have reflected something more like a crush or obsession that 
tends to distort judgment, much as a person in the grip of infatuation 
views the object of that affection as though it has no faults and with 
blinders as to the contextual realities surrounding this outpouring of often 
one-sided emotion.5  This uncritical amore for arbitration—and a 
corresponding, if subconscious, derogation of litigation, at least if 
resorted to by consumers or employees—has produced a body of Federal 
Arbitration Act jurisprudence that has been something far short of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s finest hour. 
But at the same time, the Court has resembled the suitor—or perhaps 
an overbearing parent having “birthed” an expansion of mandatory 
arbitration6—in that it loves something only when it does what is 
expected.  The Court loves arbitration, but only when arbitration 
functions as the Court thinks it should.  Where arbitration seeks to 
embrace class-wide solutions to disputes, the Court’s amore turns almost 
to anger.7  In fact, it seems that the only time the Court does not make 
                                                          
 4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).  The Court in its decisions often uses the short form “FAA” for 
the Act, which is grating and even confusing.  Prior to the modern era of substantial Supreme Court 
arbitration jurisprudence, the acronym FAA was synonymous with “Federal Aviation 
Administration,” and so it will remain in this article, where the Federal Arbitration Act will be 
referred to as the “Act” or the “Arbitration Act.” 
 5. This Article talks of the “Court” primarily as a matter of shorthand, recognizing of course 
that many of the Court’s arbitration decisions have divided the Justices, including some 5–4 votes on 
important issues.  To be sure, some Justices are not under the spell of arbitration, but the Court as a 
whole has been under such a spell from approximately the mid-1980s to the present. 
 6. See infra notes 167–287 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s mid-1980s move 
from viewing the Arbitration Act as setting procedural law for federal courts to treating the act as 
substantive federal law). 
 7. See infra notes 355–74, 386–423 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (2011)). 
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figurative goo-goo eyes about the wonder of arbitration is when the 
Court thinks that arbitration has become too close to litigation by seeking 
class-wide treatment of disputes,8 which is something largely opposed by 
the business community with which the Court is arguably even more 
infatuated.9 
The Court’s embrace of arbitration suggests both infatuation and 
fickleness.  Infatuation, at least in adjudication, is perhaps something 
worse than blind or even erratic love in that infatuation connotes the type 
                                                          
 8. In Concepcion, the Court did both.  See supra notes 386–423 and accompanying text.  It—
rather, five out of nine of its Justices—lavishly praised arbitration while simultaneously suggesting 
that all of these wonderful attributes of arbitration were eradicated if the arbitration involved class-
wide treatment of a dispute.  See notes 386–423 and accompanying text. 
 9. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 
(2010) (noting the degree to which the Court in recent years has favored business litigants and 
results generally regarded as ideologically and politically conservative); J. Mitchell Pickerill, 
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1063, 1063 (2009) (“Since John Roberts assumed the Chief Justiceship, the proportion of the docket 
devoted to business litigation appears to have increased; outcomes seem more likely to favor 
business interests; and the Court seems to be more consensual in its pro-business decisions, with 
divisions seemingly defying the expected conservative-liberal blocs.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Big Business 
and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929, 932–34 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme 
Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at MM38; David G. Savage, High Court Is Good for 
Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A1; David G. Savage, Supreme Court Gives Firms a 
Stronger Hand, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at B1 (“The Supreme Court, which winds up its term 
Monday, has once again shown itself to be highly skeptical of large lawsuits against big business, 
regardless of whether the suits are intended to protect workers, consumers or the environment.”). 
Dean Chemerinsky in fact uses the practical impact of the Court’s arbitration cases as an 
example of unreasonable, pro-business jurisprudence.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 227–31 
(criticizing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)); infra notes 320–28 and 
accompanying text (discussing Circuit City).  As Dean Chemerinsky explained: 
Several years ago, I bought a new computer from Dell.  I was about to teach the 
material on arbitration to my first-year civil procedure class and decided to read the fine 
print that came with the agreement accompanying the computer.  There was a clause that 
said that by buying the computer and by turning it on, I was agreeing that any dispute that 
I would have with Dell would go to arbitration and not to a jury trial.  I sent a letter back 
to Dell saying, “I do not consent to this and by opening my letter you hereby consent that 
I can take you to court.”  I am pleased to report that the computer worked fine and that I 
had no occasion for suing Dell. 
[This example and another given earlier in the book] are illustrations of a national 
trend toward businesses demanding arbitration whenever possible and rejecting courts 
and jury trials. . . . 
Yale law professor Judith Resnik has documented . . . [that] businesses prefer 
arbitration . . . [in part because there is] an institutionalized bias among arbiters in favor 
of repeat players in the system. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Supreme Court has been pushing matters to arbitration when there is no such 
agreement between the parties. 
Id. at 227–28 (discussing Circuit City as an example of a poorly reasoned arbitration decision unfair 
to workers). 
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of head-over-heels, uncritically high regard or worship one associates 
with an immature “crush” or the placing of an object of affection on a 
figurative pedestal.  But just as the infatuated might take a 180-degree 
turn against an object of affection, during the past two Terms the Court 
has taken such a turn, restricting the scope of arbitration in the face of 
objections by the economically powerful.10 
Although the Court has been enamored of arbitration for three 
decades, the Court’s love of arbitration took a distinctly tainted turn 
under the Roberts Court.  Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
worked a sea change in the law with their elevation of the status of 
mandatory binding arbitration,11 there were at least moments of caution 
and care as those Courts on occasion attempted—albeit highly 
imperfectly—to fairly apply the controlling statute, the Federal 
Arbitration Act.12  By contrast, the Roberts Court appears to have shed 
any fidelity to the rules of statutory construction, civil litigation, or 
judicial neutrality in promoting arbitration—except when arbitration is at 
odds with the interests of a more economically favored and powerful 
litigant.13 
Fifteen years ago, the Court’s preference for arbitration was so 
pronounced that I described it as an “infatuation” in which the Court 
                                                          
 10. See infra notes 355–74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen); infra notes 386–
423, and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion). 
 11. Some scholars take the view that a standardized pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
contained in a contract of adhesion is not a “mandatory” binding arbitration agreement but simply a 
consensual contract.  The view expressed in this Article is to the contrary.  When courts enforce a 
standardized arbitration agreement that is part of a take-it-or-leave-it transaction, relatively hidden in 
the documentation of the transaction and not negotiated by the parties, the arbitration clause is not so 
much a contractual agreement as a required term of a transaction (e.g., borrowing funds, buying a 
cell phone) or relationship (e.g., employment).  At least this is true so long as courts tend to give 
short shrift to the issue of whether the party adhering to the arbitration clause really “agreed” to the 
clause.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral 
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1430 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel, 
Bootstrapping and Slouching] (noting judicial reluctance to seriously examine issues of consent to 
arbitration clauses); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo 
Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 261 (2007) (noting the degree to which arbitration is, as a practical matter, 
imposed by the contracting party with greater leverage); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum 
Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 432–34 (2008) (noting the degree to which 
modern arbitration is often imposed en masse upon consumers or employees rather than being 
agreed to as part of contract negotiations); accord, Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of 
Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) (making a 
similar point and referring to what this Article labels “new” or “mass” arbitration, in which 
standardized contracts issued in high volume routinely provide for arbitration). 
 12. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
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ignored important issues of consent in contracting.14  At that time, the 
Court’s uncritical embrace of arbitration was only a dozen years old, a 
pre-teen crush of sorts.  The Court’s strongly pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence, which began in 1983 or 1984—depending on which 
arbitration critic you read,15 or perhaps even earlier16—is now in its late 
twenties, a time when usually even the most romantic young person has 
grown up emotionally or at least been stripped of adolescent naivety. 
But the Court’s relentless veneration of arbitration continues 
unabated, as disturbingly reflected in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,17 Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,18 and AT&T 
Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion.19  In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court overturned an 
arbitration panel’s decision to permit class action treatment of a matter 
based on the record of the dispute and the custom and practice of dispute 
resolution in this industry.20  In Rent-A-Center, the Court permitted the 
drafter of the arbitration agreement to eject the judiciary from the process 
of determining whether an arbitration agreement had in fact been made—
a decision at odds with the statutory language and the Court’s prior 
precedent forbidding the parties to agree to an expanded judicial role in 
policing arbitration agreements and outcomes.21  In Concepcion, the 
Court upheld an arbitration clause restricting class actions 
notwithstanding California state contract law that deemed the term 
unconscionable as an impermissible limitation on consumer remedies.22 
As discussed below, Concepcion is a particularly glaring display (by 
a bare 5–4 majority vote) of the Court’s infatuation with arbitration 
overcoming what should have been its fidelity to the language, 
                                                          
 14. See Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching, supra note 11, at 1412. 
 15. Compare Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660 (1996) (describing new pro-
arbitration jurisprudence of the Court as beginning with Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)), with Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, 
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 S. CT. REV. 331, 880 (describing the Court’s pro-arbitration era as 
beginning with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)), and Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a 
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 757, 776–79 (2004) (also 
seeing Southland as the inauguration of the Court’s strong pro-arbitration jurisprudence). 
 16. See infra Part III.B–C (discussing pre-Moses H. Cone cases). 
 17. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 18. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 19. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 20. See infra notes 355–74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen). 
 21. See infra notes 375–85 and accompanying text (discussing Rent-A-Center.). 
 22. See infra notes 386–423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion). 
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legislative intent, and purpose of the Arbitration Act as well as 
inadequate appreciation of states’ rights and the legal system’s 
commitment to making the class action remedy available in appropriate 
cases.23  Concepcion, like Stolt-Nielsen, is also a reflection of the Court’s 
tainted love—an infatuation with arbitration when faced with issues of 
contract law, party consent, statutory construction, or public policy but a 
rejection of class action arbitration.  Apparently, the Court’s uncritical 
view of arbitration shatters when confronted with its hostility to class 
actions and its concern that powerful economic interests might lose some 
of their advantage from the leveling effects of the class device.24 
Rather than solely picking on Concepcion as a particularly egregious 
example of the continued swoon of the Court (or at least five members of 
the Court) regarding arbitration25 or attacking many of the Court’s 
modern arbitration decisions on their outcomes alone, this discussion will 
focus on the degree to which the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has 
been disturbing not merely because it is often wrong (at least in the eyes 
of many academic commentators and the dissenting Justices) but because 
it also has so frequently been at odds with the professed jurisprudential 
principles of the very Justices who have favored outcomes of enforced 
arbitrability. 
When the arbitration decisions of the past three decades are 
examined under the majoritarian Justices’ own widely accepted standards 
of jurisprudence and statutory construction, the decisions frequently fail 
the test of consistency and principle.  In arbitration case after arbitration 
case, a majority of the Court has jettisoned the profession’s alleged 
polestar jurisprudential principles in favor of compelling arbitration—
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement 
Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 
1166 (2005) (noting the degree to which class treatment of issues tends to increase the leverage of 
less powerful litigants and observing that institutional or repeat-player litigants such as governments, 
businesses, or insurers tend to have this power in ordinary, non-class litigation); accord Bruce Hay 
& David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and 
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378–82 (2000) (noting the leveling effect of class 
treatment).  For discussion of the degree to which repeat-player litigants have advantages over “one-
shot” litigants (e.g., consumers, employees, or debtors), see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come 
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (the 
seminal article on this point); see also Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, 
Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 807–09 (1999) (finding 
continued vitality in Professor Galanter’s typology and observation); Stempel, supra, at 1166 n.140. 
 25. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 
(2011). 
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unless it is the politically and economically stronger party that opposes 
arbitration, producing result-oriented adjudication that ranks among the 
worst examples in the Court’s history.26 
As a consequence, the Court has expanded the scope of the Federal 
Arbitration Act in ways that are inconsistent with the role of the judiciary 
as fair and principled stewards of the rule of law.  Instead of consistent 
application of bedrock legal principles, the pro-arbitration Court 
decisions of the modern era have often been just that—pro-arbitration 
decisions fueled by infatuation with arbitration (or concerns about 
maintaining the distinction between arbitration and litigation) sprinkled 
with occasionally blatant preferences for the more powerful, rather than 
the type of reflective assessment one expects from the bench. 
In “going gaga” over arbitration, the Court has diminished itself in 
the eyes of wide segments of the academy, the legal profession, and the 
public.27  As Justice Jackson famously observed, the Court is not 
infallible but it is final.28  As a result, American law is for the moment 
“stuck” with the Court’s arbitration decisions.  But they have been 
controversial enough to fuel at least some non-trivial efforts at a 
legislative response,29 something that could become reality should the 
                                                          
 26. There is, of course, always ample room to debate which Supreme Court decisions are the 
“worst.”  See, e.g., Symposium, Supreme Mistakes: Exploring the Most Maligned Decisions in 
Supreme Court History, 39 PEPPER. L. REV. 1–223 (2011) (legal scholars examine infamously bad 
Court decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)); Carol J. Williams, Scholars 
Look at ‘Supreme Mistakes’, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2011, at AA3 (discussing Pepperdine Symposium); 
Symposium, The Worst Supreme Court Decision Ever?, 13 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (legal 
scholars identify less notorious Supreme Court decisions as among the “worst” because of poor 
judicial craft, disingenuousness, or failure to appreciate the full context of the case). 
 27. Although there is substantial scholarship generally approving the Court’s modern arbitration 
jurisprudence, the bulk of commentary on the Court’s arbitration decisions of the past forty years has 
been quite critical.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 15, at 758–62 (gathering critical commentary); see 
also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business; Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s approval of pre-dispute arbitration clauses); Sternlight, supra note 15. 
 28. Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 540 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2007, S. 1782, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies 
and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 491–93 (2011) (discussing legislative efforts including the 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 and the role of recent Supreme Court decisions in motivating its 
proponents); Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 102–03 (2010) (discussing the role of recent 
Supreme Court decisions in motivating legislative efforts like the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009). 
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Democratic Party regain control of Congress.30  Further, many of the 
arbitration precedents were either analytically infirm or the result of a 
closely divided Court.31  They remain vulnerable to overruling depending 
on the luck of incumbent longevity and whether retirements or deaths 
take place during the term of a Republican or Democratic president.32 
                                                          
 30. See Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback: Supreme Court’s Anti-Consumer Rulings Trigger 
Democratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/ 
10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisions-democratic-bills_n_1022207.html (predicting that reform 
of the Arbitration Act will fail to pass in the current Congress because of Republican opposition).  
Although an unfortunately large proportion of legal scholarship proceeds as if judicial decisions are 
made in a political vacuum, there are clear ideological, political, and even partisan divisions over 
mandated arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements, particularly “new” or “mass” 
arbitration agreements.  See Stempel, Mandating, supra note 11, at 398–99 (discussing the “Counter-
Revolutionary Voices” opposing the trend toward “mass” arbitration).  The strongest support for 
aggressive enforcement of the widespread standardized use of arbitration agreements has come from 
the business community, its counsel, political conservatives, and allied political interests.  See 
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 78 (describing the Act as intended for the benefit of its business 
community proponents).  Conversely, the Court’s enthusiasm for promoting mandatory arbitration 
has been most resisted by consumer groups, employee groups, plaintiffs’ counsel, and political 
liberals.  See generally Sternlight, supra note 15, at 701 (arguing that “unregulated mandatory 
binding arbitration agreements can be detrimental to consumers, employees, and other little guys”). 
 31. Several of the decisions treated by this article as most problematic were decided in 5–4 
votes.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Ctr. 
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1758 (2010). 
 32. Again, a little candor is in order notwithstanding the tendency of much legal scholarship to 
act as though the Justices’ prior political affiliations are irrelevant to their judicial decision-making.  
In nearly all of the Court’s reasonably “close” arbitration decisions of recent vintage—those decided 
by 5–4 or 6–3 votes—the Justices supporting enforced arbitration, but resisting class-wide 
arbitration, have been those appointed by Republican presidents while those resisting compelled 
arbitration or supporting class-wide arbitration were those appointed by Democratic presidents. 
For example, the current Court’s pro-arbitration/anti-class action stalwarts are Chief Justice 
John Roberts (appointed by Republican President George W. Bush) and Justices Samuel Alito 
(appointed by George W. Bush), Clarence Thomas (appointed by Republican President George H.W. 
Bush), Antonin Scalia (appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan), and Anthony Kennedy 
(appointed by Reagan).  The Justices resistant to imposed mass arbitration are Elena Kagan 
(appointed by Democratic President Barack Obama), Sonia Sotomayor (appointed by Obama), 
Stephen Breyer (appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton), and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(appointed by Clinton). 
Justice John Paul Stevens (appointed by Republican President Gerald R. Ford), who preceded 
Justice Kagan as a member of the Roberts Court, was perhaps the only real exception to this pattern, 
although one can make similar but weaker claims regarding Justice David Souter (appointed by 
George H.W. Bush).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (appointed by Reagan), an important member of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, also was less predictable in her arbitration jurisprudence, most 
prominently in opposing the Court’s 1984 decision declaring that the Federal Arbitration Act 
constituted substantive federal law rather than merely a rule of procedure applicable in federal 
courts.  See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also 
infra notes 169–214 and accompanying text (discussing Southland).  To an extent, Justice Thomas 
sometimes runs counter to this typology.  For example, during his first decade on the Court, he took 
the O’Connor position that Southland was wrongly decided.  See infra notes 288, 314, 336, and 341 
and accompanying text.  But since the dawn of the Roberts Court in 2004, Justice Thomas has 
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almost always aligned with the pro-arbitration interests or the pro-powerful business forces.  See 
infra Part III.C–D (discussing arbitration cases of the late Rehnquist Court and the Roberts Court). 
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Although many questions of law are sufficiently political to engender 
opposition and thoughts of turning the tables in the future, the arbitration 
precedents are a lightning rod for criticism as well as possible legislative 
reform.  These are particularly bad Court decisions in part because of 
their outcomes (e.g., requiring employees to arbitrate, shunting disputes 
to potentially unfair forums, or preventing class action treatment for the 
very types of cases for which they were designed).  The Court’s 
arbitration decisions are perhaps most condemnable because they reflect 
Court majorities in which the prevailing Justices were so attracted to 
arbitration (consciously or subconsciously)—or rather a particular type 
of arbitration that was distinctly more constrained than litigation—on 
grounds of personal preference that they acted in derogation of 
mainstream legal analysis as well as their own asserted long-time 
jurisprudence of adjudication and correct construction of positive law. 
II. THE LEGAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL ROAD AND THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE JUSTICES 
The term “rule of law” has now been so overused as to become 
something of a cliché.  Both lawyers and laypersons increasingly seem to 
see judging as an exercise in policy preferences, a perception fed by 
recent battles over the disqualification practices of the Supreme Court as 
Democrats and Republicans squared off in efforts to keep Justices Elena 
Kagan and Clarence Thomas from participating in the review of the 
constitutionality of the Obama administration’s health care legislation 
enacted in 2010.33 
                                                          
 33. See Tony Mauro, Kagan, Thomas Appear Unlikely to Recuse in Health Care Reform Case, 
246 N.Y. L.J. 6, Nov. 17, 2011, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticle 
NY.jsp?id=1202532665408&slreturn=1 (describing calls for Justice Kagan’s recusal based on her 
prior job as Solicitor General at the time when the Obama administration was considering legal 
strategy in defending the Affordable Health Care Act of 2009 and for  Justice Thomas’s recusal 
based on his wife’s employment as a conservative activist opposing the law). 
The conventional wisdom is that under prevailing rules neither Justice must recuse.  See  
Michael Mukasey, The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2011, at A17 (former 
federal trial judge and attorney general finding no merit to recusal arguments); Dahlia Lithwick, 
Musing About Recusing, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/should_elena_kagan_recuse_herself_from_the_obamacare
_case_of_course_not_.html (prominent liberal legal journalist expressing a similar view).  And as a 
practical matter, both Justices decided against recusing themselves from the case.  How Health Care 
Case Will Unfold Before the Court, NPR (Mar. 24, 2012, 7:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=149277795. 
But there was substantial support for the view that recusal would have been apt.  See, e.g., 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Kagan Must Recuse from Obamacare Case, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at B1 
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Despite increasingly obvious partisan invocation of the law, a 
substantial portion of the bench and the legal profession in general, 
continues to agree about basic aspects of jurisprudence.  Even if judges 
cannot always agree about the precise contours of “the law” by which we 
will be ruled, they usually can agree on the rules of the legal process and, 
in particular, approaches to construing statutes, assessing constitutional 
concerns, adhering to stare decisis, and applying precedent.34  The legal 
system embraces a reasonably concrete set of basic ground rules for 
statutory construction.35  The Supreme Court similarly embraces—or at 
least claims to embrace—these mainstream judicial approaches.36  
                                                                                                                       
(noted conservative law professor finding grounds for Kagan recusal); Deborah Rhode, Ethical 
Oversight for the Justices, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011, available at http://law.com/jsp/ 
nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202485716021 (noted liberal law professor finding Justice Thomas’s 
situation troubling and noting other instances of excessive coziness between conservative Justices 
and powerful business or government figures with matters before the Court, most infamously Justice 
Scalia’s duck hunting trip with former Vice President Dick Cheney, then a defendant in a case 
challenging his energy task force’s confidential meetings with industry lobbyists). 
The situation raised enough discomfort to spawn two lawsuits directed toward developing 
evidence in support of recusal—one by a liberal group, one by a conservative group—and proposed 
legislation broadening the grounds for disqualification of the Justices.  See Supreme Court 
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing application 
of the Code of Conduct to Supreme Court Justices); Media Research Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Nos. 10-2013 (ESH), 11-0426 (ESH), 2011 WL 4852224, at *13 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (granting 
summary judgment on a motion by the Justice Department in a consolidated action under Freedom 
of Information Act). 
 34. See, e.g., EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 
163–206, 253–296, 329–340 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing stare decisis and precedent, as well as 
theories and sources of statutory interpretation and canons of construction, noting that at least “a 
moderately strong consensus . . . holds among most contemporary judges” regarding theories of 
statutory interpretation); see also MICHAEL A. BERCH, REBECCA WHITE BERCH & RALPH S. 
SPRITZER, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 34–35, 40–
52, 57–69, 379–86, 436–46, 476–77 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the concept of stare decisis and role of 
precedent in judicial decisions, with a focus on jurists’ views of the judicial process and function, 
with additional discussion of the interpretation of statutes and constitutional limitations on the power 
of federal courts to hear cases).  See generally CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND 
WRITING 53–67 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the role of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis in 
the court system). 
 35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY chs. 7–8 (4th ed. 2007) (describing mainstream 
approaches to statutory construction based on a law’s text, legislative background, purpose, and 
function); see also id. at 847–1100 (discussing widely accepted rules, presumptions, and canons of 
statutory construction as well as accepted extrinsic sources for statutory interpretation, including 
legislative background). 
 36. See, e.g., Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (stating that the 
interpretation of a word or phrase in a statute “depends upon reading the whole statutory text, 
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that 
inform the analysis”); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (holding that the text of a 
statute resolved a dispute over interpretation, remarking that the Court “must presume that [the] 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there” (citation omitted) 
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Justices in the majority in most of the arbitration cases over the past 
thirty years are particularly likely to style themselves as mainstream and 
resist allegations of judicial activism,37 although their application of 
mainstream jurisprudence often has a conservative slant.38 
                                                                                                                       
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 
U.S. 117, 128 (1991) (“As always, we begin with the language of the statute and ask whether 
Congress has spoken on the subject before us.  ‘If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” 
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984))); 
see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14–37 
(1997) (expressing support for strict textual reading of law, following established doctrine, and 
deferring to original understanding of laws); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A Practicing Judge’s 
Perspective, 78 TEX. L. REV. 761, 766 (2000) (expressing a less text-centered view that gives more 
weight to legislative background and functional operation of statutes but a view not widely disparate 
from that of the considerably more conservative Justice Scalia); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of 
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (arguing for the use 
of legislative history when the statute’s text is ambiguous); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184–85 (1989) (expressing support for strict textual reading, 
following established doctrine, and deferring to original understanding of laws).  See generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (expressing a legal realist view of the judicial 
process that includes a chapter entitled “The Supreme Court Is a Political Court” but nonetheless 
also observing the widespread judicial embrace of mainstream legal principles and the strong 
tendency of jurists to wish to be perceived as fair-minded, mainstream, and not excessively political, 
partisan, or result-oriented). 
 37. See generally TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 358–61, 380–432 (2001) (discussing the backgrounds and the professional and public 
view of the mainstream judicial approaches of Justices William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. 
White, Thurgood Marshall, Warren E. Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, 
John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, 
Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, all Justices participating in the Court’s 
modern arbitration decisions during the period from 1980 to the present); DAVID G. SAVAGE, II 
GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1049–61, 1160–66 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing Court 
membership and fitting Justices into legal establishment even if they are otherwise demographically 
diverse and providing brief biographies of Justices involved in Court’s modern arbitration decisions 
from Justice William Brennan to Justice Sonia Sotomayor). 
This Article is not naively suggesting that there are no significant jurisprudential differences 
between the Justices.  On the contrary, some are distinctly more liberal or more conservative, more 
formalist or functionalist, more textual or more contextual than others.  See generally HENRY J. 
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th ed. 2008) (providing a particularly candid and 
realistic history of the degree to which ideological, jurisprudential, political, and even partisan 
factors played a role in the appointment and confirmation process).  But notwithstanding the very 
real differences between the Justices, a review of their backgrounds demonstrates that all qualify as 
“mainstream” judicial actors that purport to agree on basic premises of the legal process and do not 
espouse “impermissible” views that would have threatened or precluded nomination and 
confirmation. 
 38. In particular Justices such as Warren Burger, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, 
David Souter, John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito are generally 
characterized as judicial conservatives, particularly the latter four.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 
233–324 (discussing the judicial conservatism of these Justices as it related to their appointment); 
HALL, supra note 37, at 384–87, 404–23 (describing the political leanings of Justices Burger, 
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This judicial center of gravity seems particularly well established in 
matters of statutory interpretation.  Although the Court’s major 
arbitration cases present a range of legal questions, all are statutory 
construction cases focusing on the proper application of the Federal 
Arbitration Act—sometimes alone, sometimes in combination or 
arguable conflict with other statutes.  Regarding statutory construction, 
the Supreme Court, during the same period that it has longingly 
embraced arbitration, has also professed fidelity to a statutory 
construction regime emphasizing the following interpretative tools. 
A. Statutory Text 
Mainstream legal thought places substantial emphasis on statutory 
text, and the Court has repeatedly used a statute’s text as the starting 
point for assessing a statute such as the Arbitration Act.39  Justice 
Antonin Scalia is famous for his heavily textualist brand of statutory 
construction that looks almost exclusively at the text of the statute and 
eschews examination of the legislative history of the law or its overall 
purpose.40  But even relative non-textualists such as Justice Stephen 
                                                                                                                       
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST 
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 107–96 (2004) 
(describing the rise of the conservative wing of the Court starting with the end of the Warren era).  
See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 311–36, 362–77 (1993) 
(describing the historical development of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 463–64, 492, 504–05, 514, 512–13, 521–22 
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).  But none of these Justices are described as so conservative as to 
fall outside the judicial mainstream or be accused of espousing views inconsistent with the basic 
legal canon.  But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9 (suggesting that in practice and application, the 
current conservative Justices are rendering decisions inconsistent with the Constitution). 
 39. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 765–66 (noting that Judge Frank Easterbrook insists 
that courts have no authority even to apply a statute to a problem unless the statute’s language 
clearly targets that problem); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) 
(relying on the “plain meaning” of the Federal Arbitration Act’s clause that excludes from coverage 
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce,” and holding that the Act exempts only contracts of employment of 
transportation workers, not all employment contracts (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2008))); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (following the “plain language of the 
FAA” in holding that the Act’s exclusionary clause did not apply to the employee’s arbitration 
agreement, which was contained in a securities registration application and not an employment 
contract). 
 40. See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 35, at 765 (noting that Justice Scalia delivered a series of 
speeches urging courts to abandon virtually any reference to legislative history); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (describing Scalia’s refusal to 
look at legislative history); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 32–33 (2006) (noting one finds more textual rhetoric in the opinions of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 
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Breyer, a comparative fan of legislative history and deferring to agency 
constructions of a statute,41 agree that the text of the law is the most 
important consideration and the place where statutory construction must 
begin.42  Chief Justice Roberts—and Chief Justices Rehnquist and 
Burger before him—and the other Justices of the current Court all agree 
on the importance of text, with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
appearing closer to Justice Scalia’s more textual orientation.  Other 
Justices serving during the modern pro-arbitration era of the Court, 
including Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, also 
reflected the legal profession’s general preference for the primacy of text 
in statutory construction, even if the primacy is at times a “soft” one.  
Overall, the Court as a whole has historically tended to operate in a 
pragmatic, largely centrist manner without undue emphasis on any 
particular method of statutory interpretation.43 
B. Legislative Intent 
All members of the Court during the modern pro-arbitration era, 
except Justice Scalia, acknowledge that the drafting history and 
                                                                                                                       
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1991) (noting that Justice Scalia has urged the abandonment of the 
Court’s traditional use of legislative history); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION, POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 5 (5th ed. 2009) (providing a 
general overview of problems with the overly textualist view and noting leavening doctrines such as 
the whole act rule and the canon against overly literal constructions that leads to an absurd result). 
 41. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 845 (1992) (defending the legitimacy of legislative intent as an interpretative tool); see also 
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 955–56, 971–73, 990 n.j (noting acceptance of legislative 
background and other extrinsic information as tools of statutory construction and collecting 
substantial academic commentary to support both Justice Breyer’s and Justice Scalia’s view of the 
role of legislative history). 
 42. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.16 (West 1947) (codifying the view that legislative intent 
“controls” judicial construction of statutory meaning) (“The object of all interpretation and 
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”); United States v. 
Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 
S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011) (stating that “[w]e begin with the text of the statute” in a case involving 
interpretation of a Fair Labor Standards Act provision); POPKIN, supra note 40, at chs. 2–5 (noting 
that for most of legal history legislative intent or purpose was seen as the touchstone of statutory 
construction and even more salient than statutory text but that text has attained more prominence in 
modern statutory construction theory). 
 43. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 57 (1994) (observing that the Court is unlikely to adhere to any single foundation 
for interpreting statutes); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (suggesting that the Court considers a broad 
range of textual, historical, and evolutive evidence when it interprets statutes) [hereinafter Eskridge 
& Frickey, Statutory Interpretation]. 
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legislative intent of a statute are relevant to determining its meaning and 
application in particular contexts.44  The Justices vary in the degree to 
which they will end their inquiry if the text appears to direct a result.45  
Some appear to see legislative history as inappropriate unless the 
statutory text is ambiguous, while others appear willing to consult 
legislative history as a check on their reading of the text.  A few, on 
occasion, even suggest that sufficiently clear legislative intent may be 
invoked to determine if seemingly clear statutory language is a drafting 
error.46  The Justices also frequently differ, of course, as to whether 
particular language is ambiguous.47 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 146–161 (2000) 
(utilizing legislative in the majority opinion by Justice O’Connor, which Justices Scalia and Thomas 
joined); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 (1989) (invoking legislative history in Justice 
White’s majority opinion); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855–61, 862–69 (1984) (using 
legislative history in Justice Marshall’s); id. at 862–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (taking a textualist 
approach); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599–602 (1983) (considering legislative 
history in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 
668, 669–70 (1979) (relying heavily on legislative background and perceived intent and purpose of 
Congress in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion); see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal 
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 169–70 (2008) (finding that both liberal and conservative Justices make 
frequent resort to legislative history); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (noting widespread 
acceptance of legislative history as an interpretative tool but contending that the Court has not been 
following “consistent and uniform rules for statutory construction and use of legislative materials”).  
But see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 987–90 (noting Justice Scalia’s opposition to the use of 
legislative history, specifically committee reports). 
 45. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 507, 527, 530 (1989) (providing 
three different approaches to the use of legislative history in the majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions). 
 46. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 10–11 (2002) (describing various “interpretive agendas” of Supreme Court 
Justices); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 
(2006) (describing the contrasting views of “purposivists” and “textualists” toward legislative 
history); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 241–42, 50–58 (2011) (describing the 
Roberts Court’s perspectives on, and use of, interpretive tools, such as legislative history and 
legislative intent). 
 47. Compare Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659–68 (2011) (concluding that no statute 
expressly and unequivocally includes a waiver of sovereign immunity to private suits for money 
damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)), with id. at 
1664–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s conclusion cannot be reconciled with the 
fact that the availability of such relief is evident in light of RLUIPA’s plain terms).  Other examples 
exist.  Compare Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (concluding the Immigration and 
Nationality Act has an ambiguity), with id. at 550 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting a statute cannot be 
deemed ambiguous until the court exhausts the traditional tools of statutory construction). 
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C. Legislative Purpose 
Legislative intent connotes a specific intent of the legislature to 
achieve a particular result or that courts apply statutory language in a 
specific way in situations envisioned by the drafters.48  Legislative 
purpose connotes more general goals of the statute.49  For example, 
where the legislative history reflects congressional consensus that 
particular legal precedents be overturned, this is a matter of legislative 
intent.  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,50 for example, was designed 
specifically to overrule the Court’s 1976 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 
decision by deeming pregnancy discrimination a violation of Title VII, a 
reversal of the Court’s finding that pregnancy discrimination by an 
employer did not violate Title VII because only women get pregnant.51 
Where, by contrast, the legislative history reflects a more general 
congressional desire to achieve certain results, or to prevent or 
discourage undesirable results, this is a matter of legislative purpose.  For 
example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199552 
(PSLRA) was designed to make it more difficult to bring securities 
violation lawsuits on the basis of a hunch and, therefore, required more 
particularized pleading.  The statute did not, however, clearly state 
whether the specified pleading standards found in case law applying 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) were adequate.53  Based on the 
legislative purpose of the law and its enactment, notwithstanding the 
existence of Rule 9(b), a judge might view the legislative purpose as 
requiring more particularized pleading than found under the Rule in 
cases subject to the PSLRA.54  Conversely, a judge might find 
                                                          
 48. See POPKIN, supra note 40, at 251–56 (noting the distinction between legislative intent as 
something specifically sought by an enacting legislature and legislative purpose as the more 
generalized goals of legislation). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 51. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134, 145–46 (1976), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; see also AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 
1962, 1967, 701 (2009) (noting that current statutory provision superseded Gilbert). 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (codification of pleading standards of Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995). 
 53. See Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading 
Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges with the 
Heightened Fraud Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 16–25 
(2010). 
 54. See, e.g., Hill v. Gozani, 638 F.3d 40, 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that  the PSLRA goes 
further than Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) with regard to the scienter element and requires that the pleading 
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
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congressional silence on the issue an indication that Congress, despite its 
general concern over weak securities claims filed on a hunch, simply 
wanted something more than mere notice pleading and wider application 
of cases taking a strong view of Rule 9(b).55 
Another example is provided by the Sherman56 and Clayton57 
Antitrust Acts, which were both designed to fight monopolization and to 
forbid contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade—
but Congress was relatively vague about how that should be done.  
Although there is some legislative history suggesting that the laws were 
designed to prevent specific behemoths such as the Sugar Trust or the 
domination of the oil industry by John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil 
Company, the statutes are, in the main, laws expressing general 
purposive guidelines.58  As a result, the courts have tended to apply 
“rules of reason” rather than per se rules in many cases challenging 
alleged anti-competitive conduct.59  Judge Posner has characterized the 
                                                                                                                       
required state of mind” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A))); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 
F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating “to the extent that Rule 9(b)’s allowance of general pleading 
with respect to mental state conflicts with the PSLRA’s requirement that plaintiffs ‘state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind,’ the PSLRA supersedes Rule 9(b) as it relates to Rule 10b-5 actions” (citation omitted) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A))). 
 55. Justice Stevens was perhaps the best known proponent of what is sometimes called the “dog 
didn’t bark” approach to statutory construction.  See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 389 
(“Congress would not have authorized vote dilution claims in judicial elections without making an 
express, unambiguous statement to that effect.”).  Under this view, congressional silence can be 
regarded as meaningful and frequently is invoked to suggest that a newly enacted statute was not 
designed to overturn an established practice touching on the area of statutory concern.  If Congress 
wanted to make a change, then it logically would have indicated as much the face of the statute or in 
the legislative history.  That Congress did not speak implies it intended no such change.  See 
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 1035. 
The metaphor is taken from the Sherlock Holmes story involving the theft of a prize racehorse 
at night from a stable in which the family dog did not bark during the burglary.  Chisom, 501 U.S. at 
396 n.23.  Holmes correctly discerns that the thief must have been “someone whom the dog knew 
well,” such that the animal was not alarmed enough to bark.  Id.; see also ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, 
Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 415 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed., 2003). 
 56. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 57. See id. §§ 12–27. 
 58. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 
10–11 (1966). 
 59. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (4th ed. 2011) (“In antitrust litigation most practices are considered to be 
analyzed under a rule of reason.  A per se rule is generally appropriate only after judges have had 
long experience with a certain practice, and have concluded that the practice produces many 
pernicious results and almost no beneficial ones.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39–40 
(2d ed. 2001) (distinguishing “Rule of Reason” from per se rules in the antitrust context); 1 JULIAN 
O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.01(2) (b) (2d ed. 1999) 
(“Consequently, the common law courts sustained particular restrictions provided that they were 
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Sherman Act as something of a common law statute, one that seems to 
invite judicial application because of the absence of specific directives in 
the law’s text or legislative history.60 
In construing the antitrust laws, the Court has used legislative 
purpose to trump the actual text of the law.  For example, if the Sherman 
Act were read literally and applied to “every” contract restraining trade,61 
franchises and licenses would be forbidden, because this is both the 
literal language of the statute and because all contracts by definition 
constrain the contracting parties to at least some degree, in that, as a 
result of the contract, they are obligated to perform or pay damages.62  
This view can also be considered akin to the “absurd result” canon of 
statutory construction, a principle positing that statutory text will not be 
applied so literally as to render an absurd result.63 
                                                                                                                       
both reasonable and ancillary to the main transaction.  Of particular importance is the fact that the 
‘rule of reason,’ a method by which the legality of restraints are analyzed, is derived directly from 
these exceptions for reasonable and ancillary restraints.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 9.02(3)(b) (“A close 
examination of the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act reveals that the Act does not make 
specific methods of business conduct or particular types of business arrangement unlawful.  
Congress chose, instead, to adopt a statute that, by the very generality of its language, would 
interdict any contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrained trade as well as monopolies.  
Because the Sherman Act is couched in such broad terms, the courts have been able to adapt it to the 
changing methods of commercial production and distribution since its enactment.”). 
 60. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 212 (1986) (“The Sherman Act is a standard 
instance of a statute that is poorly thought through, that is delivered to the courts in a severely 
incomplete state, that begs—though it doesn’t actually ask—the courts to do what they can to make 
it reasonable.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) (“Sometimes a statute will state whether it is to be 
broadly or narrowly construed; more often the structure and language of the statute will supply a 
clue.  If the legislature enacts into statute law a common law concept, as Congress did when it 
forbade agreements in ‘restraint of trade’ in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to 
interpret the statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law 
principle . . . .”); accord HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, § 2.1b (“Federal courts have always 
interpreted the antitrust statutes in a common law fashion, and the result is a substantial divergence 
between statutory language and judicial decision.”). 
 61. The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade” is illegal.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 62. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAURENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING 
DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 1–3 (2d ed. 2006) (observing that contract law exists to satisfy the 
basic impulse that the reasonable expectations excited by a promise are entitled to recompense in a 
court of law). 
 63. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (applying the absurd result exception 
to the general rule of applying the “plain” textual meaning of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509–11 (1989) (noting that a “literal reading would compel an odd result in a 
case like this”). 
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D. The Hierarchy of Legislative History 
Not all legislative history is created equal, but jurists tend to agree on 
the relative authority and persuasiveness of different forms of legislative 
history.  In general, there is a preference, in roughly the following order 
for: committee reports,64 statements by the chief authors of the 
legislation, hearing testimony and congressional reaction, floor 
statements, and contemporary accounts of enactment of the legislation.65 
E. Canons of Construction 
Canons of statutory construction are general rules for interpreting the 
laws and are derived from common understandings of drafting 
conventions, legislative processes, public policy, or jurisprudence.66  
Although varying in their affection for particular canons, all of the 
Justices appear to find them potentially useful in particular situations.  
Among the more commonly invoked canons are those of textual 
construction such as:67 
• the plain meaning rule, which requires adherence to the clear 
linguistic meaning of statutory text unless this would bring about 
an absurd result or there is evidence that the text is in error in 
departing from the specific intent of the legislature;68 
  
                                                          
 64. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative 
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (over a forty-year period, more 
than forty-five percent of the Court’s citations to legislative history were to committee reports); see, 
e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, n.7 (1984) (relying on a Senate report regarding a 
civil rights bill that was not enacted but that included similarities to the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 65. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 981, 1029 (observing that compared to committee 
reports, statements made during committee hearings and floor debates have traditionally received 
less weight); POPKIN, supra note 40, at 6, 9–11; see also OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 589–90 (3d ed. 2001) (providing an 
extensive list of twenty different forms of legislative background information that courts may use). 
 66. See generally, HETZEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 705–65 (discussing judicially created 
canons). 
 67. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B (presenting an exhaustive review of the 
canons). 
 68. See id.; see, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26–29 (2003) (noting that “when a 
statute is ‘silent or ambiguous’ we must defer to a reasonable construction”). 
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• expressio unius exclusio alterius, meaning the expression of 
one thing suggests the exclusion of things not included in the list 
or catalog;69 
• noscitur a sociis, which requires a general term to be 
construed in a manner consistent with similar specific terms in a 
statute;70 
• ejusdem generis, providing that general terms should be 
construed to reflect the class of objects shown in exemplary or 
specific terms used in the statute;71 
• preference for ordinary meaning rather than technical or 
specialist meaning (unless there is strong legislative history 
indicating congressional preference for the specialized 
meaning);72 
• continued use of the settled meaning of terms previously 
defined in adjudication;73 
• use of dictionary definitions (unless there is evidence to 
suggest this definition was not intended by Congress);74 
• deference to experts, such as administrative agencies, 
regarding the meaning of a term;75 and 
  
                                                          
 69. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 19. 
 70. See id. app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (noting 
that “[t]he constructional problem is resolved by the . . . principle . . . that a word is known by the 
company it keeps”). 
 71. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 106 (2001) (applying ejusdem generis to the terms “seamen” and “railroad 
employees”); see also infra notes 320–28 and accompanying text (discussing Circuit City). 
 72. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (citing the preference for ordinary meaning as an “ordinary rule of 
statutory construction”). 
 73. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 
543 U.S. 481, 487 (2005) (presuming that Congress intended the word “seaman” to have the same 
meaning as under established maritime law). 
 74. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 
488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (citing the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “criteria”). 
 75. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) (stating that the Court will uphold an administrative agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute). 
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• in the absence of information to establish a definition, resort 
to the default definitions of terms set forth in the Rules of 
Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, if available.76 
In addition, there are a number of grammar, punctuation, and syntax 
canons.  These include the “rule of the last antecedent”77 and the 
understanding that “may” implies discretion,78 “shall” implies something 
mandatory or less discretionary,79 and “or” is disjunctive rather than 
conjunctive.80 
Additionally, there are widely accepted canons regarding what might 
be termed the structural or “textual integrity of the statute.”81  Among 
these are: 
• the whole act rule, which provides that particular terms or 
provisions of a statute must be construed with reference to the 
entire statute and the commands and goals of the legislation;82 
• the presumption of purposive amendment, which is the view 
that amendments to a statute, unless specifically denominated as 
“housekeeping” amendments, are designed to have a significant 
substantive impact on the statute and its meaning;83 
• a preference for the avoidance of broad constructions of the 
statute unless justified by the statutory language or indications 
that Congress intended the statute to have broad construction;84 
                                                          
 76. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Stewart, 543 U.S. at 488 
(noting that the Rules of Construction Act provides the default definition of “vessel”). 
 77. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 
508 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1993) (articulating the rule of the last antecedent). 
 78. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005) (providing that “may” implies discretion). 
 79. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Mallard v. United States Dist. 
Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (stating that “shall” implies a command). 
 80. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id.; see, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630 (2007) 
(declining plaintiff’s argument because it would be inconsistent with Title VII as a whole), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 
120, 123 (1989) (holding a specific phrase of Rule 11 should be viewed in context of the rule as a 
whole), superseded by rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993). 
 83. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000). 
 84. Id. at 159–60 (narrowly construing Congressional grants of authority to the FDA).  This 
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• the view that specific terms of a statute designed to deal with 
a particular issue are generally given greater weight than more 
general provisions of the statute;85 and 
• a view that exceptions to the reach of the statute expressed by 
the legislature should be strictly construed in order to prevent 
evisceration of the statute through expansive application of 
exceptions.86 
There is also judicial agreement tending to embrace canons 
expressing a preference for “continuity in law.”87  Among these is a 
presumption of stare decisis, but acceptance that wrongly decided 
precedents can be overruled where the case for change is sufficiently 
compelling.88  In addition, there is a presumption against repeals by 
implication89 and a presumption that statutory terms are used consistently 
across statutes.90  Related to these presumptions is the in pari materia 
rule providing that the use of similar statutory provisions in comparable 
statutes will be applied in the same way.91  There is also a canon that the 
views of a later Congress are generally not seen as illuminating the views 
of an enacting Congress.92 
  
                                                                                                                       
canon sometimes comes into tension with the canon that remedial legislation is to be liberally 
construed to implement its purpose. 
 85. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524–26 (1989) (“A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is 
no more specific rule.”). 
 86. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 
U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general 
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied . . . [absent] contrary legislative intent.” 
(quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980))). 
 87. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 25–26. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549–50 (1974) (calling the 
“presumption against repeals by implication” a “cardinal rule”). 
 90. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 567–68 (1988) (discussing the interpretation of the meaning of “substantially justified” across 
statutes). 
 91. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640–43 (2007) (analyzing arguments based on analogies to the EPA and 
FLSA in an EEOC claim), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  As observed above, 
Ledbetter was legislatively overruled in 2009 because of a widespread perception that the Court’s 
holding was in error; the in pari materia canon, however, is widely followed by both liberals and 
conservatives, although they may of course differ in its application.  See sources cited supra note 82. 
 92. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 28. 
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In addition, there are also a number of canons reflecting substantive 
policy generally embraced by the courts.  Despite the legal realist truth 
that judges can differ considerably in their personal preferences, the 
bench as a group appears to accept a basic core of substantive legal, 
political, and social substantive values as well as adherence to governing 
procedural rules.  For example, a leading casebook divides these canons 
into several groups, including: 
• federalism canons, which indicate (1) a strong presumption 
against statutory construction that would alter the federal-state 
balance of power, including a “super strong” rule against federal 
invasion of core state functions,93 and (2) a presumption against 
federal preemption of traditional state regulation, although this 
presumption can be overcome by clear statutory language or 
evidence of clear congressional purpose, so long as Congress has 
authority to so act pursuant to the Supremacy Clause;94 and 
• due process canons and canons derived from common law, 
which include (1) a presumption against construing statutes in a 
manner that works to deny a jury trial otherwise available under 
the Constitution,95 (2) a presumption in favor of judicial 
review,96 and (3) a presumption in favor of enforcing forum-
selection clauses.97 
As discussed below, the bulk of these canons or other conventions of 
statutory construction weigh against most pre-arbitration jurisprudence 
of the modern Court.  The Court’s support of arbitration is now so 
sufficiently established that legal scholars have posited that we now also 
have canons of construction favoring arbitration.98  This disturbing 
                                                          
 93. See id. app. B, at 30. 
 94. See id., app. B, at 31; see, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 
(2002) (holding that an Illinois statute did not conflict with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992) (holding that the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt state law damages actions). 
 95. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 33. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id.; e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (enforcing a forum-
selection clause because it was not fundamentally unfair); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that forum-selection clauses are enforceable and 
further vital interests of the justice system). 
 98. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 38 (noting that there is “[f]ederal court 
deference to arbitral awards, even where the Federal Arbitration Act is not by its terms applicable” 
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development reflects the degree to which the Court’s excessive affection 
for a particular concept has interfered with fair application of traditional 
tools of adjudication. 
The legal profession should be hesitant to accept the premise that we 
have entered an era where there legitimately exists a “pro-arbitration” 
canon or set of canons.  Although there appear to be broad social 
concerns about excessive litigation and a preference for less formal and 
combative modes of dispute resolution,99 it is not at all clear that the 
public and the body politic reflexively favor mandatory, privatized mass 
arbitration over litigation, mediation, or some government-administered 
hybrid such as court-annexed arbitration or an ombudsperson.100  To the 
contrary, employees, consumers, debtors, and state governments—large 
segments of society—appear to have significant objections to being 
“forced” to arbitrate due to judicial enforcement of broadly worded, 
standardized arbitration clauses embedded in contracts of adhesion.101  
                                                                                                                       
and stating that there exists a “[s]trong presumption in favor of arbitration” and a “[r]ule favoring 
arbitration of federal statutory claims”). 
 99. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at 
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
297, 309–24 (1996) (reviewing the history of the modern ADR movement, which included both 
community efforts and rise of popularity of arbitration and mediation in business contexts).  A major 
spur supporting ADR was the “Pound Conference” organized by Chief Justice Burger, which 
included prominent speakers criticizing excessive litigation and extolling the benefits of ADR.  See 
id. at 316; see also Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276–27 (1982) 
(reflecting the former Chief Justice’s strong support for arbitration and other forms of ADR and use 
of the bully pulpit of Chief Justiceship to promote both private and court-annexed arbitration). 
 100. See Stempel, Mandating, supra note 11, at 385–86 (2008) (noting the substantial 
differences between the traditional style of arbitration envisioned by the Congress that enacted the 
Federal Arbitration Act and the modern mass arbitration sought by vendors, lenders, and employers 
on the basis of broadly worded standardized clauses contained in contracts of adhesion deployed in 
high volume under circumstances where non-drafters have little or no appreciation of the existence 
of the arbitration agreement or its meaning); see also generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. 
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 62, 73 (outlining a 
study showing that nearly all consumer contracts of some type (e.g., cell phone contracts) have 
arbitration clauses but that consumers are largely ignorant of them). 
 101. See, e.g., Arbitrators, Civil Rights Groups Tell U.S. Supreme Court: Don’t Erode Access to 
Courts, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm? 
ID=3105 (describing “broad coalition of civil rights groups, labor unions and consumer advocacy 
organizations” that filed amici briefs opposing mandatory arbitration in Rent-A-Center); Mandatory 
Arbitration, PUBLIC JUSTICE, http://www.publicjustice.net/Key-Issues-Cases/Access-To-Justice/ 
Mandatory-Arbitration.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (describing the group’s “Mandatory 
Arbitration Abuse Prevention Project”); Fair Arbitration, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
Page.aspx?pid=2512 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (providing resources on taking action against forced 
arbitration and arbitration fairness); All Things Considered: Rape Case Highlights Arbitration 
Debate (NPR radio broadcast June 9, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=105153315 (describing former Halliburton employee’s efforts to combat 
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One state attorney general brought charges that resulted in a large 
arbitration provider abandoning the field of debtor arbitration.102  There 
has also, of course, been substantial scholarly criticism of the 
enforcement of such clauses.103 
These factors suggest that there is not a strong national consensus in 
favor of arbitration, regardless of the contextual factors of a given case 
and arbitration agreement.  The pro-arbitration rejoinder to this 
observation, of course, is that there is a federal statute favoring 
arbitration that has been the law of the land since 1926, which is not bad 
support for a pro-arbitration canon of construction.  But this still begs the 
question of whether the Arbitration Act, which was designed to foster 
specific enforcement of arbitration clauses in traditional commercial 
contracts among merchants, was ever meant to apply to the new mass 
arbitration and whether the now eighty-six-year-old act can be 
legitimately expanded by the judiciary to the point of fairly supporting 
the existence of a pro-arbitration canon. 
Under the traditional approach to statutory construction, as discussed 
below in reviewing the Court’s thirty-year embrace of arbitration, the 
answer would appear to be a clear “no.”  The intent and purpose of the 
Act was rather narrowly focused upon merchants rather than consumers, 
employees, or debtors and specifically exempted employees, although 
the courts aggressively confined the scope of this exception, even prior to 
the modern Supreme Court amore for arbitration.104  Much of the pro-
                                                                                                                       
mandatory arbitration clauses). 
 102. See In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (2010) 
(“On July 14, 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General brought a complaint in Hennepin County 
against NAF alleging consumer fraud act and deceptive trade practices act violations and false 
advertising.  NAF settled that litigation less than a week later, agreeing to cease performing 
consumer arbitrations and entering into a consent judgment to that effect with the Minnesota 
Attorney General.”); Kathy Chu & Taylor McGraw, Minnesota Lawsuit Claims Credit Card 
Arbitration Firm Has Ties to Industry, U.S.A. TODAY, July 15, 2009, at 6A; Carrick Mollenkamp, et 
al., Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A14 
(“NAF settled the case with Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson in July without admitting the 
charges.  It agreed in the settlement to stop arbitrating credit-card cases nationwide.”); see also Tom 
Abate, Arbitration Firm Calling It Quits, S.F. CHRON., July 22, 2009, at C1 (describing similar 
lawsuit by the San Francisco city attorney’s office against the NAF); Sam Zuckerman, S.F. Sues 
Credit Card Service, Alleging Bias, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 2008, at D1 (same). 
 103. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 373–79 
(2002); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 
B. U. L. REV. 255 (1998) ; Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002); Schwartz, supra note 27; Sternlight, supra note 15; Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
 104. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
9–11 (3d ed. 2011) (describing the background of the Act and other arbitration legislation such as 
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arbitration jurisprudence of the last thirty years has emerged because the 
Court failed to faithfully apply more long-standing canons and principles 
of statutory construction.  Particularly disappointing is the Court’s 
unwillingness to follow statutory text or legislative history when it 
argues against arbitration and the Court’s failure to appreciate the 
federalism implications of Court decisions riding roughshod over the  
states’ traditional powers of contract construction and policing of 
allegedly unfair contracts. 105 
Under these circumstances, it would be a mistake via illegitimate fait 
accompli to attempt to defend the current Court’s arbitration decisions as 
justified according to a perceived pro-arbitration canon of construction.  
It is also a bit of a tautology for a court to construe a statute concerning 
arbitration through the lens of a pro-arbitration canon.  The very object 
of the exercise of judicial scrutiny is to assess the meaning of the 
arbitration statute.  Resort to a mythical pro-arbitration canon prejudges 
the issue and short circuits the judicial process. 
Although there has not been a great amount of systematic empirical 
analysis of the individual Justices’ use of the canons, it appears that the 
more politically and jurisprudentially conservative Justices make more 
frequent use of the canons, perhaps as an alternative to greater resort to 
legislative history or more open-ended public policy analyses.106  For 
example, Justice Scalia has made use of the canons, presumably because 
this permits him to better construe statutory language without resort to 
legislative history.107 
                                                                                                                       
the Uniform Arbitration Act and Labor Management Relations Act, which covers labor arbitration); 
LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 554–63 (4th ed. 2009) (describing 
the background of the Arbitration Act); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of 
Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 277–83 (1990) (describing the Act’s “genesis, 
thrust and context”). 
 105. See infra notes 355–74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen); infra notes 386–
423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion). 
 106. See James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 52–53, 57–63 (2005) (noting the degree to which 
conservative Justices invoke canons of construction more frequently than liberal Justices and that the 
Rehnquist Court utilized canons more frequently than the less conservative Burger Court); see also 
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 951 (referencing Circuit City as an example of result-oriented 
invocation of canons by conservative majority and noting that “[a] neutral observer who just read the 
statute and the legislative history in Circuit City, for example, would have expected the Court to read 
the labor exemption to the Arbitration Act much more expansively than the five-Justice majority in 
fact did”). 
 107. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 200–01 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(calling for application of the canon requiring doubts to be resolved in favor of the defendant where 
there is ambiguity in a criminal statute); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 
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F. More Controversial Approaches to Statutory Construction 
As noted above, the mainstream approach to statutory construction 
embraced by the Justices generally begins with and emphasizes text but 
also considers legislative intent and purpose to the degree appropriate so 
long as it does not strain the reading of the text.  The Court as a whole 
seems to have been less willing, or perhaps even unwilling, to endorse 
some of the less-established modes of statutory interpretation, which 
enjoy support in the academic community.  Among these are 
considerations of public policy, appreciation of interest group influence 
on legislation, and the view that construction of legislation should evolve 
with changing circumstances.108  In practice, however, it appears that 
courts use a variety of approaches that permit them to exercise more 
personal preferences than courts are willing to acknowledge.109  In 
addition, there are questions of the role of the executive branch and 
administrative agencies in the construction of statutes.110 
Against this backdrop of the generally-agreed-upon ground rules of 
statutory construction, the Court’s jurisprudence—even when it was less 
enamored of arbitration—is not a particularly fine example of judicial 
craft. Under “normal” circumstances where the Justices consistently 
applied the agreed rules of statutory interpretation, one would expect to 
see consistent fidelity to clear text, an effort to vindicate any fairly 
discernible specific intent of the enacting Congress, decisions consistent 
                                                                                                                       
515 U.S. 687, 720–21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying the canon noscitur a sociis); Chisom 
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the “regular method” for 
interpreting statutory language as follows: “first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its 
textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear 
indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies”). 
 108. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1997) 
(arguing that construction of statutes should evolve with changes in society, economics, and business 
in a manner consistent with the purposes of the enacting legislatures); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (suggesting that older statutes should be treated 
like common law precedents that can, in compelling cases, be “overruled” by courts); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (noting 
public policy considerations are frequently, if tacitly, used by courts in deciding cases and finding 
such use appropriate and legitimate but questioning particular values emphasized in certain 
decisions); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683–
84, 1813 (1975) (noting rising interest group influence on modern legislation and administrative 
agency action but diffuse as to recommended reaction).  See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 
35, Chs. 6–8 (reviewing approaches to statutory construction). 
 109. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 43, at 324–45. 
 110. See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
413 (1989) (noting that statutory interpretation extends to administrative agencies attempting to 
implement statutes). 
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with the overall purpose of the statute, and respect for traditional state 
law prerogatives unless areas of state autonomy were clearly superseded 
by a valid exercise of congressional power.  Instead, we see a mixed 
pattern of decision-making during the first six decades of the Act, 
followed by growing infatuation with arbitration, reduced adherence to 
the traditional ground rules of statutory construction, and most recently, 
an appallingly bad decision—Concepcion—that tramples upon traditional 
state contract prerogatives, federal civil disputing policy, and the 
legislative intent and purpose underlying the Act. 
III. THE PATH OF TAINTED LOVE: TRACKING THE COURT’S 
ARBITRATION DECISIONS 
As Shakespeare famously observed, “[t]he course of true love never 
did run smooth.”111  So it is with tainted love as well.  Before the modern 
Supreme Court’s infatuation with arbitration, there was substantial 
resistance, and sometimes outright hostility, to arbitration clauses 
because they were seen as improperly depriving courts of jurisdiction.  
The Federal Arbitration Act was prompted in large part by the business 
community’s dismay over such decisions and its persuasion of Congress 
that legislative overruling of anti-arbitration decisions was in order.112 
A personal favorite illustration of pre-Act judicial hostility to 
arbitration is Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten v. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og 
Foderstof Kompagniet, often also known as the Atlanten or Korn-Og.113  
In this case, decided shortly before the enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, the Court, affirming a Learned Hand trial court decision 
and a Second Circuit decision, held that even what appeared to be a 
broadly worded arbitration clause in a shipping contract between 
merchants—with no discernible issues of consumer protection, consent, 
etc.—does not require arbitration.114  The Court reasoned that the 
                                                          
 111. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S DREAM act 1, sc.1. 
 112. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380 
(1991) (describing the historical judicial resistance to arbitration and the response by businesses and 
legislators culminating in the Federal Arbitration Act); Stempel, supra note 104, at 270–90 (noting 
the degree to which some modern courts as late as the 1980s continued to resist enforcement of 
arbitration agreements based on problematic “public policy” concerns about arbitration). 
 113. 252 U.S. 313, 315–16 (1920), aff’g 250 F. 935 (2d Cir. 1918), aff’g 232 F. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 
1916). 
 114. The arbitration clause in question included the following provision: 
If any dispute arises the same to be settled by two referees, one to be appointed by the 
Captain and one by charterers or their agents, and if necessary, the arbitrators to appoint 
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arbitration clause was inapplicable because one party sought to arbitrate 
an issue of breach of contract because the claim arose out of a breach of 
the contract and not an issue related to performance of the contract.115 
Cases like Korn-Og were not that unusual.  English courts resisted 
specific enforcement of arbitration clauses on the ground that they 
improperly ousted courts of their rightful jurisdiction, a view that was 
largely adopted in the United States.  In reaction, the commercial 
community sought corrective legislation and obtained it with passage of 
the Act, now codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.116 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
The Act itself, which was passed in 1925 and had an effective date of 
January 1, 1926,117 is rather short and straight-forward.  After defining 
key terms such as “commerce” and “maritime,” the Act states: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
                                                                                                                       
an Umpire.  The decision . . . shall be final, and any party attempting to revoke this 
submission to arbitration without leave of a court shall be liable to pay to the other or 
others, as liquidated damages, the estimated amount of chartered freight. 
Id. at 315. 
 115. See Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 232 F. 
403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (“The theory appears to be that such a provision is part of the execution of 
the contract, a piece of its administration, and ought not to be construed as applicable to an entire 
change of purpose which results in the abandonment by one party of the enterprise as a whole.”).  
The logic and anti-arbitration effect of Korn-Og is baffling and shows that even great minds like 
Learned Hand can have bad days. 
 116. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 321–23 (summarizing pre-Act common law resistance to 
arbitration and the gestation and passage of the Act). 
 117. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 14 
(2006)).  Section 1 of Pub. L. No. 282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) was codified and enacted into positive 
law in Title 9 of the U.S. Code.  Prior to that, the text of Title 9 containing the Act had been legally 
viewed as “merely prima facie evidence of the law.”  S. REP. No. 664, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1947); see Philip E. Karmel, Note, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration 
Act: A Perspective from Contract Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1373, 1373 n.2 (1987); Wesley A. Sturges 
& Irving Olds Murphy, Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States 
Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 580 (1952). 
STEMPEL FINAL.docx 8/2/2012  11:31 AM 
824 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
revocation of any contract.118 
Section 3 provides that courts may issue a stay of judicial 
proceedings in order to permit arbitration to proceed pursuant to an 
enforceable agreement.119  Section 4 gives federal courts authority to 
enter an order compelling arbitration if the petitioning party to a valid 
arbitration agreement is “aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or 
refusal of another to arbitrate.”120  Several sections of the Act deal with 
procedural matters.121 
The Act provides strong support for enforcing arbitration awards, 
specifying that federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment 
based on the award,122 which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party 
the normal range of judgment collection tools under applicable 
procedural law.  Section 10 of the Act permits arbitration awards to be 
challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower than those available in 
litigation, specifically: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.123 
The final section of the Act governs appeals and reflects the 
                                                          
 118. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 119. Id. § 3. 
 120. Id. § 4. 
 121. See, e.g., id. § 5 (governing the appointment of arbitrators); id. § 6 (providing that 
applications for relief are treated as motions); id. § 7 (allowing for use witnesses and subpoenas, and 
setting fees); id. § 8 (subjecting admiralty matters, such as seizure of vessels, to arbitration); id. § 11 
(regulating modification and correction of errors in an arbitration award); id. § 13 (governing papers 
and docketing); id. § 15 (providing for the inapplicability of the “Act of State” doctrine). 
 122. Id. § 9. 
 123. Id. § 10.  Section 10 also specifically provides that a reviewing court may direct a rehearing 
by the arbitrators if a ground for vacating the award is shown.  Id. 
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congressional preference—largely through the 1990 amendments rather 
than the original 1925 enactment—to reduce appellate challenges to pro-
arbitration orders but to permit appellate review of orders refusing to  
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compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings pending 
arbitration.124 
B. The First Five Decades of Construing the Arbitration Act 
Despite passage of the Act, there remained some judicial resistance 
to arbitration, as occasionally reflected in case law over the next fifty 
years.  Most prominent was Wilko v. Swan, which held—seemingly out 
of the blue—that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 were 
not subject to arbitration, regardless of the clarity of the arbitration 
clause, the knowing and voluntary consent of the parties, the standard 
practice of the industry, or the expectations of the parties.125 
In a similar vein was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,126 
which the Court implicitly revisited and reversed in the watershed 
Southland Corp. v. Keating127 decision.  In Bernhardt, the Court held that 
the Arbitration Act was procedural rather than substantive and 
consequently was subject to the Erie doctrine, which made Vermont law 
applicable in the instant case.128  Under Vermont law, an arbitration 
agreement of the type at bar was unenforceable.129  Hence, arbitration 
was not required, regardless of the contracting circumstances.130 
The Court took a more receptive approach to arbitration in the 
context of labor arbitration in the Steelworkers Trilogy, three cases 
involving disputes between the then-powerful United Steelworkers union 
and companies with which it had collective bargaining agreements 
providing for arbitration of workplace disputes.131  Some argue that these 
                                                          
 124. Section 16 states that “an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order” granting a 
stay of litigation, directing/compelling arbitration, or refusing to enjoin an arbitration except 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits trial courts to certify for immediate review decisions 
involving close legal questions where the judge believes earlier appellate review will expedite 
ultimate disposition of the matter.  Id. § 16(b)(1)–(4); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 125. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (ruling that enforcing an agreement to arbitrate was tantamount to 
permitting a waiver of the substantive protections of the 1933 Act), overruled by Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  The dissenting Justices objected on the 
ground that a forum selection clause requiring arbitration did not deprive a claimant of the 
substantive benefits of the Act.  Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 126. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
 127. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 128. 350 U.S. at 208. 
 129. Id. at 204–06. 
 130. See id.  Bernhardt was a diversity case, prompting the Court to apply the Erie doctrine in 
concluding that rather than enforcing the Arbitration Act, the federal court sitting in diversity should 
apply Vermont law, which prevented specific enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Id. at 212. 
 131. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564–66 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
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cases—rather than the Court’s 1980s cases promoting arbitration—
comprise the inauguration of the modern era of Supreme Court precedent 
favoring arbitration.132  In United Steelworkers v. American 
Manufacturing Co. and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., the Court enforced arbitration agreements.133  In United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., the Court announced a 
very deferential standard for the review of labor arbitration decisions, 
holding that the decision would be confirmed by courts so long as the 
arbitrator’s decision “draws its essence” from the agreement.134  A cynic 
might note that even a horribly erroneous decision can still deal with the 
essence or core of the agreement giving rise to the dispute. 
Because these three cases were so focused on labor arbitration rather 
than commercial or consumer arbitration, they can be considered 
precursors to the modern era.  To be sure, the Court showed signs of 
greater affection for arbitration, but that resulted largely from the Court’s 
view that arbitration is a particularly critical component of the collective 
bargaining process and an established means by which labor peace is 
preserved.135  As the Court’s other 1960s and 1970s cases show, the  
  
                                                                                                                       
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 575–77 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel 
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594–96 (1960). 
 132. See Linda R. Hirchsman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1985) (viewing the Steelworkers Trilogy as important but seeing 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, 
and Southland Corp. v. Keating as a “second” important arbitration trilogy); see also infra notes 
162–222 and accompanying text (discussing Byrd, Moses H. Cone, and Southland). 
 133. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567–69; Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581–85. 
 134. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597–99.  The Enterprise Wheel standard of review of 
labor arbitration awards actually differs from the standard of review set forth in section 11 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which underscores the longstanding view that the Act was aimed directly at 
commercial arbitration.  Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 11.  In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court fashioned labor 
arbitration law on the strength of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which the 
Court has construed to provide authority for common law development of federal labor law.  
Warrior, 363 U.S. at 577–78; see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) 
(holding that federal law applies to suits under § 301(a)); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award is presumptively valid unless the 
arbitrators have exceeded their powers or acted with bias or favoritism.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Moses H. 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).  Although this may not be 
much different in practice than the Enterprise Wheel “draws-its-essence-from-the-agreement test,” 
one can make a strong case that the same standard should apply to review of both labor and 
commercial arbitration awards.  See Mark W. Lee, Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: Refining the Standard of Review, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 1011–17 (1985) (arguing 
that the Act’s standard better serves the public policy favoring labor arbitration). 
 135. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567–69 (“Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as 
a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the agreement.”). 
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Court was warming to arbitration but continued to have doubts about it 
outside the labor arena.136 
In Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., a plumbing and 
heating subcontractor filed suit in Georgia to collect funds allegedly 
owed it by the general contractor for a United States government missile 
site and successfully resisted arbitration even though the contractor had 
previously filed an action in New York seeking to enforce the arbitration 
clause.137  The Court found that the subcontractor had adequately alleged 
an issue regarding possible fraud regarding the procurement of the 
arbitration agreement.138  This seems a classic case of “old” or traditional 
commercial arbitration rather than the “new” or “mass” arbitration of 
retail consumer matters that has troubled many.139  One might argue, 
however, that the terms of the arbitration agreement unfairly subjected 
the subcontractor to a seriously inconvenient forum.140  Notwithstanding 
the Steelworkers Trilogy, Moseley suggested the Court’s continuing 
wariness toward arbitration.141 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the 
Court held (arguably overruling Moseley) that a question of fraudulent 
inducement as to the contract containing an arbitration clause was in the 
first instance a question for the arbitrator.142  By giving arbitrators “first 
dibs” on these questions, the Court appeared to approach a more 
favorable attitude toward arbitration.143  Continuing this substantial 
deference to private dispute resolution agreements, the Court in Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. enforced a forum selection clause in a maritime 
towing agreement, even though the party adhering to the towing contract 
had relatively little bargaining power in light of the disabled condition of 
its vessel.144  The case was regarded as a sign that the Court was 
beginning to look more favorably on such private dispute resolution 
agreements.145  Logically, this suggested a similar shift in the Court’s 
                                                          
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 137–61. 
 137. 374 U.S. 167, 168–71 (1963). 
 138. See id. at 170–72. 
 139. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between traditional, 
individualized, “old” style commercial arbitration and “new” standardized mass arbitration of 
consumer, employment, and debtor–creditor disputes); see also Stempel, supra note 15. 
 140. See Stempel, supra note 112, at 1397 (discussing Moseley in detail). 
 141. Id. 
 142. 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). 
 143. See id. 403–06; Stempel, supra note 112, at 1390–92 (discussing Prima Paint). 
 144. See 407 U.S. 1, 9–20 (1972). 
 145. See Harold G. Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, 
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attitude toward arbitration agreements.  Zapata is another precursor to 
the modern era, however, because it was a case of traditional commercial 
arbitration rather than of new mass arbitration affecting consumers. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware involved a 
dispute over wage claims.146  The Court refused to enforce the standard 
arbitration clause signed by workers in the financial services industry as 
a condition of their employment because of a state law prohibiting 
arbitration of wage claims.147  Although this decision is now effectively 
overruled by Southland and its progeny,148 the latter cases are arguably 
distinguishable in that the state law in Ware appears more directly aimed 
against arbitration, while the state law in Southland was applicable to any 
contract provisions waiving substantive rights as a condition of obtaining 
a franchise.149  In view of the Court’s most recent arbitration decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which refused to apply state contract 
law to arbitration agreements despite the language of the Federal 
Arbitration Act inviting its application,150 Ware is effectively dead 
(absent a change in Court composition and a willingness to re-examine 
the issue) and represents the Court’s old skeptical concern about 
arbitration rather than its newfound affection for arbitration.151 
                                                                                                                       
Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 387, 398 (1973) (“When [Prima Paint] is read 
together with Zapata one conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that all agreements to arbitrate 
as well as all reasonable selections of forums in international commercial contracts will be enforced 
in the federal courts.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: 
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 307 n.49 (1988) 
(gathering commentary regarding Zapata); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the 
United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 124, 127 (1973) (noting Zapata brought a 
“more favorable climate for forum selection clauses”); Willis L. M. Reese, The Supreme Court 
Supports Enforcement of Choice of Forum Clauses, 7 INT’L LAW. 530, 537 (1973) (“The initial 
judicial hostility to such clauses appears to be on the wane . . . .”). 
 146. 414 U.S. 117, 119 (1973). 
 147. Id. at 119–25, 140. 
 148. See infra notes 169–214 and accompanying text (discussing Southland and its overruling of 
Bernhardt). 
 149. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2 (West 2007) (“[T]he court shall order the petitioner and 
the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the 
controversy exists.”); Ware, 414 U.S. at 122–23. 
 150. See infra notes 386–423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion). 
 151. The issue of permissible state “interference” with arbitration is even a bit more complicated 
because, in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court struck down a Montana law requiring that 
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements comply with certain disclosure requirements.  517 U.S. 
681, 689 (1996).  Casarotto clearly seems to constructively overrule Ware.  See id.  But in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court astonishingly suggested that even though it was preventing 
application of California’s judicially crafted doctrine of unconscionability as a contract defense, the 
states might be free to enact the type of specific legislation that Court had struck down in Casarotto.  
See infra notes 413–21 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of Concepcion). 
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A year after Ware, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court 
enforced an arbitration clause—one calling for arbitration in France—
contained in a sale-of-business agreement between a businessperson and 
a large multinational company.152  Although a trip to France is hardly the 
greatest dispute resolution burden one might face, the Court’s 
enforcement reflects its general comfort with arbitration, at least in the 
commercial context.  But, as in Zapata, the Court was dealing with old-
style commercial arbitration and not the new mass arbitration of 
consumer complaints that would arise as a consequence of the Court’s 
pro-arbitration jurisprudence.153  Even so, scholarly discussion of the 
decision expressed concern that the franchisee dealing with the 
manufacturer might lack sufficient independence, savvy, and bargaining 
power, as well as concern that the language and reasoning of Scherk 
could lead to more aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses 
contained in consumer contracts.154 
As of the mid-1970s, the Court’s approach could be characterized as 
one of greater acceptance of arbitration but with some continuing 
concern or even outright hostility when arbitration clauses swept 
statutory claims within their textual ambit.  For example, in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., the Title VII claim of a union employee was held 
to be beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the 
                                                          
 152. 417 U.S. 506, 508–09, 512–20 (1974). 
 153. Id. at 517; see supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 154. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement 
of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 408 (1987) (“Scherk is most commonly 
acknowledged as standing for the proposition that international securities transactions are not subject 
to the Wilko limitation on the enforceability of arbitration clauses.  The case, however, stands for 
much more than that.”); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protections of the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Anti-Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 57 (1980) (“[T]he Court in Scherk 
does not appear to have limited its rationale to ‘truly international transactions.’ On the contrary, it 
implied rather strongly that its holding applied to transactions having fewer foreign contacts than the 
transaction in Scherk.”) ; Brett Robert Chapman, Comment, The Case for Domestic Arbitration of 
Federal Securities Claims: Is the Wilko Doctrine Still Valid?, 16 SW. U. L. REV. 619, 641 (1986) 
(“The Supreme Court took care in both Mitsubishi and Scherk to distinguish the decisions from their 
domestic equivalent.  This distinction is without merit, for both decisions rest on an implied 
recognition of the capabilities of foreign arbitral tribunals to make subjective findings of intent and 
knowledge involving complex statutory rights. No rational basis exists for continued denial of 
similar capabilities in their domestic counterparts.”); Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note, Will the Courts 
Sherck The Little Old Lady in Dubuque?  The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver on the Individual 
Investor in a Global Securities Market, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129, 146–47 (1985) (“The existence of 
unequal bargaining power at the time an agreement is made argues strongly for inapplicability of 
Scherk . . . . “); Stephen C. Sieberson, Note, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. and Arbitration Under the 
Securities Exchange Act: A Comity of Errors, 1 J. CORP. L. 100, 119 (1975) (“The most satisfying 
formulation would be one that focuses on the bargaining posture of the securities buyer.”). 
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collective bargaining agreement to which he was subject.155  Although 
the decision can be fairly regarded as one merely interpreting the scope 
of the arbitration clause and the nature of union–management dispute 
resolution as opposed to a civil rights claim, the decision can also be read 
as one applying a statutory or public policy exception to the Arbitration 
Act.156  In any event, Alexander suggested that the Court remained at 
least mildly skeptical about arbitration in some contexts. 
For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 
the Court held that a broadly worked arbitration clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement did not apply to the workers’ Fair Labor Standards 
Act claims.157  Barrentine stands pretty clearly as a case applying a 
“statutory” claims exception to arbitration in the manner of Wilko v. 
Swan.158  After Barrentine, the Court, although not overtly hostile to 
arbitration, continued to limit its reach and deny arbitrability for certain 
types of cases.159  In McDonald v. City of West Branch, in a fashion quite 
similar to Barrentine, the Court refused to compel arbitration of civil 
rights claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,160 suggesting that the 
Court had not yet fully embraced arbitration.161 
C. The Modern Era of Arbitration at the Court 
Within a short time after McDonald, the Court’s affection for 
arbitration solidified.  Despite early-1980s cases such as Barrentine and 
McDonald that reflected continued wariness about arbitration, by the 
mid-1980s the Court had embarked on a new path.  Decided during the 
same term as McDonald, the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v. Mercury Construction Corp. enforced an arbitration agreement in a 
dispute over a construction project between the buyer-hospital and the 
general contractor.162  The hospital sought a state court order staying 
arbitration proceedings notwithstanding that the construction contract  
  
                                                          
 155. See 415 U.S. 36, 38–43, 59–60 (1974). 
 156. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 321–23. 
 157. 450 U.S. 728, 730, 745 (1981). 
 158. See id. at 740; supra notes 125 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 308–19 (discussing Barrentine). 
 160. 466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984). 
 161. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 323–27 (discussing McDonald). 
 162. 460 U.S. 1, 5, 29 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) (2006). 
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contained a broadly worded arbitration clause committing all such 
contracts-related disputes to arbitration.163 
The Court’s decision to compel arbitration and reject the view that 
Colorado River abstention164 was required of the federal court by notions 
of deference to ongoing state proceedings165 made eminent sense.  In 
dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor argued that in its zeal to render the pro-arbitration ruling, the 
majority had been too quick to find a sufficiently final order that 
permitted appeal.166  Legal realists might also note with some irony that 
in Moses H. Cone, it was three of the Court’s Republican-appointed 
conservatives who had misgivings about the pro-arbitration result—
exactly the opposite of the trend in the current Court. 
What prompts some to see Moses H. Cone as the dawn of the 
modern pro-arbitration era is its rhetoric favoring arbitration.167  More 
substantively, the Moses H. Cone majority states that the Act 
“create[s] . . . a substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”168  In other words, 
the Act appeared to apply in state courts as well as in federal court.  But 
this issue was not prominently addressed until the Court’s next important 
arbitration case.  Although the Moses H. Cone decision favored 
arbitration, it was not the full-fledged infatuation that came in Southland 
Corp. v. Keating,169 which most regard as the dawn of the Court’s 
modern pro-arbitration jurisprudence. 
  
                                                          
 163. Id. at 5–7. 
 164. Colorado River abstention, named after Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–21 (1976), occurs when a federal court dismisses or stays proceedings 
based on the existence of concurrent state court proceedings involving the same parties and 
controversy.  See ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 4.5 (8th ed. 2011). 
 165. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13–23. 
 166. See id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 24 (majority opinion) (viewing section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act as “a 
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding 
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”).  The Court continued: 
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act established that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself 
or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 
Id. at 24–25. 
 168. See id. at 24. 
 169. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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Southland involved a dispute between the convenience store chain 7-
Eleven and a California franchisee.170  The franchise agreement 
contained a broadly worded arbitration clause,171 which the franchisor 
sought to enforce in order to compel arbitration of the dispute.172  The 
franchisee resisted, citing a portion of the state’s franchise law that 
forbade enforcement of waivers of franchisee rights.173  The California 
Supreme Court reasoned that an arbitration clause was in effect a waiver 
of the franchisee’s right to seek judicial relief in the event of a 
controversy over the franchise agreement.174  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed.175 
Southland thus presented, in starker relief than Moses H. Cone, the 
issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive federal law 
that took precedence over contrary state law.  The Supreme Court could 
not alter the construction of a state statute declared by the state’s highest 
court, even if it found the reasoning—here, that agreement to arbitration 
was a sufficient waiver of substantive rights to be forbidden under state 
franchise law—flawed.176  If the decision was to be reversed, it had to be 
because the state law was powerless against a federal law commanding 
arbitration177—as the Southland Court so found, over the dissents of 
Justice Stevens178 and Justice O’Connor (joined by Justice Rehnquist).179 
Southland, authored by Chief Justice Burger, who had been 
promoting alternative dispute resolution from the bully pulpit of the 
Chief’s office,180 also appears to mark the beginning of an ideological 
shift in that Republican and conservative Justices, who might otherwise 
have opposed broad arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and 
states’ rights grounds, became arbitration advocates notwithstanding the 
powerful pull these concepts normally exert over Republicans and 
                                                          
 170. Id. at 3–5. 
 171. Id. at 4. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 4–5. 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. See id. at 6–10 (“Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of the state statute 
was ‘drawn into question’ on federal grounds by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to 
resolve the question as a matter of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).”). 
 177. See id. at 10–14 (“Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) which 
provides for an appeal from a final judgment of the highest court of a state when the validity of a 
challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal law.”). 
 178. Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 21. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 180. See infra note 211and accompanying text. 
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conservatives.  Justice Rehnquist would soon be largely supportive of 
outcomes favorable to arbitration.181  Although Justice O’Connor 
continued to express opposition to the nationalization and 
substantification of the Arbitration Act in Southland,182 and was later 
joined by Justice Thomas, there are today no Republican-appointed 
Justices opposing arbitrability in close cases.183 
The Southland majority embraced the modern view of the Act as 
federal substantive law, relying in part on the statement to that effect in 
Justice Brennan’s Moses H. Cone opinion.184  Although acknowledging 
that “the legislative history [of the Act] is not without ambiguities,” the 
Court found that “there are strong indications that Congress had in mind 
something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in 
the federal courts.”185  The Court further found that “[i]n creating a 
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress 
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.”186  Thus, the Court held “that 
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violate[d] the 
Supremacy Clause” and contained inconsistencies with the Arbitration 
Act.187 
Like Moses H. Cone, Southland can be defended as a reasonable 
decision that does not reflect excessive swooning over arbitration as a 
forum preferable to court.  The text of section 2 of the Act certainly 
admits of a substantive law construction even if it does not compel the 
Southland result.  The case was a commercial dispute akin to the type of 
paradigmatic vendor–customer disputes that proponents of the Act had in 
mind when lobbying for the legislation.188  Although franchisees 
typically are smaller, poorer, and have less leverage than franchisors—at 
least once the relationship commences—franchisees are usually 
                                                          
 181. See, e.g., infra notes 215–22 and accompanying text (discussing Byrd); infra notes 230–42 
and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi). 
 182. 465 U.S. at 21–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 183. See infra Part III.D (discussing modern cases in which Republican appointees and 
conservatives support arbitration generally but oppose class-wide treatment of arbitrable disputes 
while Democratic appointees and moderates/liberals oppose arbitrability in certain contexts). 
 184. See 465 U.S. at 14–15; supra text accompanying note 169. 
 185. 465 U.S. at 12. 
 186. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 89, 94 (1992) (noting proponents’ concerns regarding 
interstate business contracts). 
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competent and often experienced businesspersons or they never would 
have been awarded the franchise.  They are usually not business 
innocents, and they seldom can credibly claim to be particularly 
surprised by the presence of an arbitration clause in the franchise 
agreement given the ubiquity of such clauses in business-to-business 
contracts throughout the twentieth century.189 
And unlike consumers signing form receipts before hurrying away 
from a cash register or continuing to pay bills without reading inserted 
brochures, franchisees would seem rather certain to have actually read 
any arbitration clause in the franchise agreement—or at least reasonably 
can be expected to have actually read the franchise agreement.  
Becoming a franchisee is a major event in one’s working life that 
logically prompts some study of the terms and conditions insisted upon 
by the franchisor.  To perhaps state the obvious: no one forces a 
franchisee to become a franchisee.  If a franchisor’s terms are too 
unfavorable, the a prospective franchisee continues to have what appears 
to be the fine option of hanging on to his or her savings, avoiding the risk 
of a failed franchise, and continuing to work at whatever had provided 
the prospective franchisee with the funds that made her eligible for a 
franchise in the first place. 
In short, it is difficult to cry very hard for the losing franchisee in a 
case like Southland, provided that the arbitration forum in which the 
dispute is heard is a fair one and the procedures available permit 
adequate factual development of issues involved in the dispute.  
Southland only required arbitration.190  It did not declare that 7-Eleven 
was certain to win. 
Southland can thus be defended as a fair result consistent with the 
general support for arbitration reflected in the Act and motivated by 
reasonable public policy concerns in favor of consistency among state 
and federal courts regarding enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration  
agreements.  Southland may reflect love for arbitration, but this is not the 
tainted, reckless love the court would later shower upon arbitration.191 
But neither is Southland a particularly encouraging example of the 
High Court in action.  Although the majority has a plausible textual 
                                                          
 189. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, William A. Darrin, Jr. & Benjamin A. Levin, Franchisor 
Attempts to Control the Dispute Resolution Forum: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Trumps the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s Decision in Kubis, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 237, 238 (1998) (noting that 
“[m]any franchisors use arbitration”). 
 190. 465 U.S. at 17. 
 191. See supra Part I (discussing the Court’s infatuation with arbitration through the years). 
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construction of the Act, it can also be argued that the Act’s language 
stating that arbitration agreements may be avoided on “grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”192 includes 
illegality under applicable state law such as the California Franchise 
Investment Act.  Although it would not be well articulated for another 
decade or so,193 a natural reading of this statutory language also clearly 
encompasses state contract law concepts such as fraud, 
misrepresentation, and unconscionability (both procedural and 
substantive) that can support setting aside contract terms such as 
arbitration clauses if the terms are deemed sufficiently oppressive. 
The majority has a plausible view of the legislative history.194  But 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent is much more thorough in its exploration of 
legislative history and quite convincing in its argument that the Act was 
always intended by Congress only to apply to federal court proceedings, 
which were, at the time, the proceedings with which the commercial 
proponents of the Act were concerned.195  In an important illumination of 
the result-orientation of the Southland majority, Justice O’Connor notes 
that Southland is effectively overruling Bernhardt,196 which had viewed 
the Arbitration Act as procedural and thus applied Erie197 to require that 
the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause litigated in 
Vermont federal court be decided by Vermont law.198  But the Southland 
majority does not even cite Bernhardt, let alone address it and explain 
why its reasoning some thirty years earlier—much closer to the time the 
Arbitration Act was passed—was in error. 
This failure suggests that the Southland majority may have been 
excessively intent on expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on 
personal preference grounds rather than giving the issue the careful 
reading of precedent that it deserved.  Even if one agrees with the 
Southland majority that the time had come to consider the Act as 
                                                          
 192. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 193. See Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching, supra note 11, at 1385–86 (discussing different 
ways in which the Federal Arbitration Act has been and can be interpreted). 
 194. For the majority’s discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, see 
Southland, 465 U.S. at 12–16. 
 195. Id. at 25–29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 196. See id. at 23 (noting that Bernhardt found “the duty to arbitrate a contract dispute is 
outcome-determinative . . . and . . . governed by state law in federal diversity cases”).  For a 
discussion of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of American, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), see supra notes 126–
30 and accompanying text. 
 197. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 198. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202–05. 
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substantive federal law applicable in state court, the Bernhardt–Erie 
question at least needed to be addressed.  Instead, the Southland majority 
dodged the issue—another indication of the Court’s rush to embrace 
arbitration notwithstanding the normal rules of adjudication in the face of 
contrary precedent. 
Both Justice O’Connor’s dissent and Justice Stevens’ concurrence 
and dissent in Southland make a strong case that the majority’s 
application of the Act is inconsistent with the federalism and states’ 
rights concerns that not only tend to animate U.S. law but also appear to 
have been on the mind of the enacting Congress.  Justice Stevens, in 
addition to noting Justice O’Connor’s compelling review of the 
legislative history of the Act, focuses on the importance of states’ rights 
and federalism as a strong background norm of statutory interpretation: 
The general rule prescribed by § 2 of [the Act] is that arbitration 
clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are enforceable as 
a matter of federal law.  That general rule, however, is subject to an 
exception based on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.  I believe that exception leaves room for the 
implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be 
undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses. 
 The exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by 
State law will not be deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress . . . . 
 The limited objective of the Federal Arbitration Act was to abrogate 
the general common law rule against specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements . . . . [B]eyond this conclusion, which seems 
compelled by the language of § 2 and case law concerning the Act, it is 
by no means clear that Congress intended entirely to displace state 
authority in this field. . . . [W]e must be cautious in construing the act 
lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional 
policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the states . . . . 
. . . The existence of a federal statute enunciating a substantive federal 
policy does not necessarily require the inexorable application of a 
uniform federal rule of decision notwithstanding the differing 
conditions which may exist in the several States and regardless of the 
decisions of the States to exert police powers as they deem best for the 
welfare of their citizens.  Indeed, the lower courts generally look to 
State law regarding questions of formation of the arbitration agreement 
under § 2 . . . . 
A contract which is deemed void is surely revocable at law or in equity, 
and the California Legislature has declared all conditions purporting to 
waive compliance with the protections of the Franchise Investment 
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Law, including but not limited to arbitration provisions, void as a 
matter of public policy.  Given the importance to the State of franchise 
relationships, the relative disparity in the bargaining positions between 
the franchisor and the franchisee, and the remedial purpose of the 
California Act, I believe this declaration of state policy is entitled to 
respect.199 
The opinion by Justice Stevens, like much of his judicial work, 
makes its insights concisely but powerfully and stakes out a moderate 
position consistent with his overall approach to law.200  He respects the 
text of the statute but does not read it woodenly or hyper-literally.  
Instead, he reads the text with a healthy reverence for the legislative 
history of the law that may shed light on specific legislative intent.  He is 
mindful of the purpose of the statute and practical realities of modern 
commerce and regulation.  He respects state prerogatives in an area of 
traditional state autonomy and the federalist model of U.S. government 
and law.  He is willing to read the Act as laying down substantive law 
applicable in state as well as federal court, but he gives breathing space 
to state contract law and regulation.  He appreciates that the California 
franchise law is not an anti-arbitration law but a franchisee protection 
law, which arguably takes it out of the broad reach of the Act’s201 
compelling of arbitration and puts it into the savings clause of section 2 
of the Act. 
                                                          
 199. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17–20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386 
(2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200. See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 
200–03 (2010) (discussing Stevens’s independent approach to law); Symposium, The Finest Legal 
Mind: A Symposium in Celebration of Justice John Paul Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1263 (2011).  Articles 
in this symposium noted Justice Stevens’s eclectic, flexible, and centrist approach to legal issues that 
contrasted with more doctrinaire Justices of the left or right.  See, e.g., Justin Driver, Judicial 
Inconsistency as Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1263, 1264 (2011) (discussing 
different views of Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence and tenure on the Court); Jamal Greene, The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) (describing Justice Stevens as “more 
a justice of standards than a justice of rules”); see also Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice 
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557 (2006); John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About 
Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2009–10 (2006) (describing Justice Stevens’s 
approach to statutory interpretation). 
In his lone dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery, in fewer than two pages, Justice 
Stevens demolishes the majority’s concern that wage regulation of local government employees was 
too much of a federal intrusion on state sovereignty to withstand Tenth Amendment scrutiny.  See 
426 U.S. 833, 880–81 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Within a decade, the full Court came to 
appreciate his wisdom and overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). 
 201. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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Justice Stevens also correctly recognizes, in light of Justice 
O’Connor’s strong arguments based on legislative history, that the 
Southland majority is engaging in what might be termed “dynamic” or 
“evolutive” statutory construction202 by adapting the 1925 legislation to 
1984 commercial reality.  Even though he was not persuaded of the 
applicability of the Act to the California Franchise Investment Act, he 
noted that “Justice O’Connor’s review of the legislative history . . . 
demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute viewed the 
statute as essentially procedural in nature,” and he observed that 
“intervening developments in the law” nonetheless compelled the 
conclusion reached by the Court—that the Act is substantive law.203 
The opinion by Justice Stevens in Southland sets a standard by which 
we can assess the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence in the emerging pro-
arbitration or “infatuation” era.  Unlike the majority opinion, Justice 
Stevens’ opinion is consistent with mainstream statutory construction, 
save perhaps that dynamic statutory construction has not been expressly 
embraced by the legal mainstream, even though the Court sometimes 
applies it implicitly, as did the Southland majority.204 
Rightly or wrongly, Southland is an example of dynamic or evolutive 
statutory construction.  The majority expanded the reach of the statute 
beyond the specific intent of the enacting Congress—and perhaps 
beyond the basic purpose of the statute as well—although the Southland 
result can be defended, in part, on broad legislative grounds (i.e., general 
congressional support for arbitration).  But in its sub silentio dynamism, 
the Southland majority arguably over-reads the text of the Act and 
minimizes or ignores traditional mainstream concerns of federalism, 
historical practice, restraint in expanding congressional power absent a 
clear statement, and deference to traditional state prerogatives. 
That the Southland majority was at least partially blinded by love 
because of its substantive attraction to arbitration seems clear in light of 
the membership of the Southland majority.  Majority opinion author 
Chief Justice Burger is widely regarded as a jurisprudential conservative, 
one who would never embrace dynamic or evolutive statutory 
construction.205  Similarly, he was a supporter of states’ rights.206  One 
                                                          
 202. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the evolutive/dynamic statutory 
construction approach). 
 203. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17, 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 204. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing evolutive approaches to statutory 
construction). 
 205. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 239 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting the Chief 
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would not have expected Chief Justice Burger to overturn—without so 
much as a mention or nod—precedent that has stood for thirty years, like 
Bernhardt,207 and to dramatically expand the reach of a federal statute 
beyond the conceptions of the drafters. 
Judge Posner once observed, with perhaps uncomfortable accuracy, 
that most judicial conservatives tend to be strict constructionists of 
legislation because they usually wish the statute had not gone so far, 
while most judicial liberals tend to be “no constructionists” because they 
wish the statute had gone further.208  But where arbitration was 
concerned, Chief Justice Burger ran counter to this stereotype, as would, 
in time, the remainder of the Court’s conservatives.  Southland finds 
Chief Justice Burger pretending that the legislative history of the Federal 
Arbitration Act clearly favors compelled arbitration,209 an unpersuasive 
argument even if one likes the outcome in Southland.  He similarly reads 
the text of the law in a manner friendly to the party desiring arbitration210 
rather than a manner supportive of the State of California, even though 
the statutory text clearly embraces the use of standard state contract 
law—and perhaps any state law affecting contracts so long as it is not an 
unreasonable impediment to federal policy.  Under the standard rules of 
statutory interpretation, California should have received more judicial 
deference than 7-Eleven.  Instead, the Court came to 7-Eleven’s rescue, 
invoking national legislation to steamroll state regulatory efforts—hardly 
the stuff one expects from a mainstream or conservative Court such as 
the one sitting during the 1983 Term. 
In Southland, Chief Justice Burger was not being true to his 
professed jurisprudential self.  He was, however, being true to his 
personal preference and public-policy self.  Chief Justice Burger had 
long been a strong supporter of alternative dispute resolution and a 
strong critic of what he perceived as an unwise litigation explosion.211  
                                                                                                                       
Justice’s general conservatism); HALL, supra note 37, at 384–87 (describing Chief Justice Burger as 
a judicial conservative). 
 206. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 247 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting the Chief 
Justice’s, and other Justices’, general support for state prerogatives); HALL, supra note 37, at 384–87 
(describing Chief Justice Burger as supporter of states’ authority, particularly in criminal matters). 
 207. 350 U.S. 198 (1956); see supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 208. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 293 (1985). 
 209. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1984) (using the Arbitration Act’s 
legislative history to infer that Congress meant for it to have a broad reach). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?  Trends 
in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 688–705 (1993) (noting 
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Similarly, one could credibly accuse the other Justices in the majority of 
inconsistency driven by a personal preference for more arbitration and 
less litigation, or out of a view that the time, expense, and procedural 
protection of litigation, including lay jury trials, offers an unfair 
advantage to deadbeat franchisees or saddles businesses with undue 
transaction costs in seeking to enforce their franchise agreements. 
Joining the Southland majority opinion were Justices Brennan, 
White, Blackmun, and Powell.212  With the exception of Justice Brennan, 
who espoused support for a “living Constitution” to be interpreted 
consistently with changes in American society (but who seldom 
embraced statutory dynamism with equivalent zeal) and who tended to 
favor federal authority over state authority in many cases,213 these 
Justices were traditionalists who eschewed dynamism for original 
legislative intent and federalism over unitary control by a central 
government.214  But in Southland they embraced a result seemingly at 
                                                                                                                       
the anti-litigation turn taken by legal elites in part as a response to Chief Justice Burger’s efforts, 
including the 1976 Pound Conference, which criticized litigation as wasteful and inefficient, and 
extolled the virtues of alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration). 
 212. See 465 U.S. at 1 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); id. at 21 (O’Connor, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 213. In Southland, however, Justice Brennan arguably acted inconsistently with his general 
sympathy for less powerful litigants such as workers, women, racial and ethnic minorities, and small 
businesspersons.  See generally SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL 
CHAMPION (2010) (tracing the life, career, and judicial philosophy of Justice Brennan). 
   214.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 233–34 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting that 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell were generally viewed as moderates, and observing that when 
Justice Blackmun first joined the Court, his voting was more conservative and closer to that of Chief 
Justice Burger); HALL, supra note 37, at 368–71, 388–95 (describing Justice White as a moderate 
and recounting Justice Blackmun’s close voting record with Chief Justice Burger); see also LINDA 
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 102–21 (2005) (noting Justice Blackmun’s general 
drift toward more liberal stances during the latter half of his time on the Court). 
Both Justices Blackmun and Powell arguably were selected for the Court because of their 
moderation.  Prior to their emergence as candidates for the Court, President Nixon had nominated G. 
Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth to open seats, only to have both run into confirmation 
problems.  ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 10–13.  Nixon needed to submit new names of candidates 
who would not have the arguable problems of competence—Carswell—or conflict of interest—
Haynsworth—(although the allegations against Haynsworth, a respected Fourth Circuit judge, are 
not, in the wisdom of hindsight, considered unfair by most observers) as well as having sufficient 
centrist tendencies that Democrats would not fight as too conservative.  Id.  Justice Powell, a former 
ABA president, and Justice Blackmun, a long-time Eighth Circuit judge and former counsel to the 
Mayo Clinic, both fit the bill as impeccable mainstream candidates for the Court.  HALL, supra note 
37, at 389, 393; ABRAHAM, supra note 37, 13–15 (describing President Nixon’s appointments of 
Justices Blackmun and Powell to the Supreme Court).  For other descriptions of President Nixon’s 
appointment process, see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT & LEGAL 
CHANGE: ABORTION & THE DEATH PENALTY 16–17 (1992); RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS 
OF RICHARD NIXON 415, 420–24 (1978); RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 126, 132, 134, 151–52, 164, 185–86 (2001); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE UNITED 
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odds with their professed jurisprudential philosophies.  The logical 
catalyst for this departure from their traditional moorings in Southland 
was a substantive preference for arbitration, even if this group was not 
overtly cheerleading for alternative dispute resolution and decrying 
litigation. 
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, decided in 1985, the year after 
Southland, the Court continued in a pro-arbitration vein, but a defensible 
one.215  The issue was whether a customer’s mixture of federal securities 
claims—not arbitrable because of Wilko216—and state law claims—
clearly arbitrable by themselves under the Act—prevented arbitration of 
the state claims because they were intertwined with the non-arbitrable 
federal claim.217  Resolving a split in the circuits, the Court rejected the 
intertwinement doctrine that had required all claims to go to litigation 
and held that arbitration of the state law claims could be compelled and 
need not await resolution of the securities claims.218  The Court 
recognized that there could be preclusion issues, depending on which 
adjudication took place first, but it did not attempt to provide guidance 
on that issue.219  The Byrd decision was unanimous,220 a reflection of its 
reasonableness under the circumstances—the Court was saddled with the 
Wilko precedent that was steadily falling out of fashion.  The Byrd 
opinion supports more arbitration rather than less, but it can hardly be 
viewed as unduly colored by personal preferences for arbitration. 
Concurring separately, Justice White, a member of the Moses H. 
Cone and Southland majorities, and a consistent supporter of arbitration 
during his time on the Court, criticized Wilko, noting that the holding 
involved only claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and that courts 
cannot assume the same reasoning applies to claims brought under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.221  Justice White argued that there were 
sufficient differences between the laws such that Wilko’s restriction on 
                                                                                                                       
STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 303 (2005); Michael A. Genovese, Richard M. 
Nixon and the Politicization of Justice, in WATERGATE AND AFTERWARD: THE LEGACY OF RICHARD 
M. NIXON 79 (1992). 
 215. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
 216. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989); see supra notes 125 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Wilko). 
 217. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214. 
 218. Id. at 223–24. 
 219. Id. at 221–24. 
 220. Id. at 213. 
 221. Id. at 224–25 (White, J., concurring). 
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arbitration should be confined strictly to claims under the 1933 Act.222  
Although Justice White’s attempt to differentiate the statutes is not 
particularly persuasive, it is an important small step toward overruling 
Wilko—and its shaky reasoning based on the 1933 Act and the Burger 
Court majority’s personal public-policy preferences—and removing 
statutory restrictions on arbitration. 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the 
Court again supported arbitration, dealing an implicit blow to cases like 
Wilko, Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald that had restricted 
arbitration for statutory claims.223  The Court found no legal barrier to 
requiring arbitration of antitrust claims raised by an automobile retailer 
in its dispute with the manufacturer.224  The contract between the retailer 
and the manufacturer, as might be expected in this commercial setting, 
contained a broadly worded arbitration clause.225 
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun found no basis in 
statutory text, legislative intent or purpose, or public policy for cutting 
back the scope of the arbitration agreement merely because one of the 
bases of dispute involved a federal statute.226  In reaching this result, the 
Court sounded more loudly the death knell of Wilko and similar cases 
that opposed arbitration of certain claims based on public policy grounds.  
“[W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every 
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory 
claims,” wrote Justice Blackmun.227  The majority opinion reiterated 
much of the pro-arbitration rhetoric of Moses H. Cone, Southland, and 
Prima Paint about the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.228 
Lost in some of the rhetoric was the better interpretation that 
Congress intended to mandate enforcement of validly made arbitration 
agreements more than it was making a general endorsement of arbitration 
under all circumstances.  But the arbitration clause at issue between these 
                                                          
 222. Id. 
 223. 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); see supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko 
and Barrentine); supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander); supra notes 
160–61 and accompanying text (discussing McDonald). 
 224. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640. 
 225. See id. at 617 (discussing the terms of the sales contract). 
 226. Id. at 636–40. 
 227. Id. at 625. 
 228. Id. at 625–26 (analyzing Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Prima Point); see supra notes 
142–43 and accompanying text (discussing Prima Paint); supra notes 162–69 and accompanying 
text (discussing Moses H. Cone), supra notes 169–214 and accompanying text (discussing 
Southland). 
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merchants did not raise serious issues of consent, construction, fraud, 
coercion, or other bases for setting aside the agreement.229  The party 
resisting arbitration hoped that the Court, like some lower courts, would 
find antitrust law too sacred to be submitted to arbitrators, even at the 
request of the parties. 
Mitsubishi can thus be seen as part of the arbitration trend of the 
1980s, but not a case where the Court is unduly infatuated with 
arbitration.  Certainly, the entire Court was not infatuated.230  The 
Court’s rejection of a statutory claim defense to arbitration was rejected 
by only a 5–3 majority.231  At this juncture, one can argue it is the 
dissenters who are unfaithful to their normal jurisprudential approaches 
of applying the statute as written with appreciation of legislative intent, 
congressional purpose, and the norms of contract formation and 
enforcement. 
In dissent, Justice Brennan, the author of Moses H. Cone and part of 
the Southland majority, suddenly positioned himself against arbitration 
merely because the case involved an antitrust claim.232  Despite 
dissenting here, Justice Marshall had also been part of the Moses H. 
Cone and Southland majorities.  Justice Stevens’ dissent was arguably 
inconsistent with his prior positions as well, but the issues in Southland 
are distinct from the statutory exception question presented in Mitsubishi 
and prior cases such as Wilko, Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald.  
But Justice Stevens is also arguably consistent in his respect for stare 
decisis.233  He often took the position that precedents, even precedents he 
viewed as incorrect at the time decided, should be respected going 
forward, absent very strong intervening events counseling overruling.234  
                                                          
 229. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617. 
 230. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell did not 
participate in the decision.  Id. 
 231. Id. at 614 (majority opinion). 
 232. See id. at 640 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 233. See id. at 650 (concluding that because the Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction 
between federal statutory rights and contract rights and that arbitration has been used almost entirely 
in labor and commercial disputes, a presumption exists that arbitration clauses do not apply to 
federal statutory claims). 
 234. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (adhering to precedent 
even though “contemporary . . . jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to 
arise for the first time today”); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 
420, 423–24 (1986) (refusing to reject settled Court precedent even assuming the decision “was 
unwise as a matter of [public] policy” and that its reasoning had been undermined by subsequent 
procedural and judicial developments, as these developments “are insufficient to overcome the 
strong presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute”). 
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His dissent can be defended as merely seeking to treat antitrust claims 
the same as 1933 Securities Act claims (and perhaps 1934 Act claims as 
well), Title VII claims, Fair Labor Standards Act Claims (FLSA), and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claims—all of which had been exempted to a degree from 
arbitration in the Court’s prior decisions.235  At this juncture, Justice 
Stevens was willing to embrace the statutory exception perhaps as much 
for its pedigree as for its rationale.236 
But Justice Stevens in his Mitsubishi dissent appears to be more than 
just a reluctant follower of precedent.237  He seems to enthusiastically 
embrace the notion that there is something different about statutory 
claims that makes them unsuitable for arbitration—or at least outside the 
intended scope of the Arbitration Act.238  Justice Stevens, whose 
Southland dissent was so persuasive, had a tough position to defend in 
Mitsubishi, where the dissent is considerably less convincing.  The text 
of the Arbitration Act contains no restraint on statutory claims.239  The 
legislative history reflects no congressional aversion to arbitration of 
such claims.240  The purpose and background of the statute, although 
contract-focused and praising commercial actor expertise, do not suggest 
that Congress viewed arbitrators as incompetent on statutory claims.241  
Pragmatically, it would also appear odd and inefficient to separate 
antitrust claims from the rest of a dispute that arbitrators must hear in any 
event.  But whatever one’s views on the merits, the case, while pro-
arbitration, does not reflect unbridled infatuation with arbitration.242 
                                                          
 235. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 647–50 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court has not allowed arbitration under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, Title VII, 
FLSA, and § 1983). 
 236. C.f. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) 
(asserting that service of process on a nonresident defendant who is physically in the forum state at 
the time of service satisfies due process because of longstanding custom and that for service 
conferring personal jurisdiction its “validation is its pedigree”). 
 237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 650–57 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(describing the unique nature of the antitrust statutes). 
 239. See supra Part II.A. 
 240. See supra note 194; see also 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. 
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT §§ 8:1–8:2 (1994) (discussing the Arbitration Act’s legislative history). 
 241. Id. 
 242. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of America is a bit of driftwood on the 
generally rising tide of arbitration.  475 U.S. 643 (1986).  Although continuing to give rhetorical 
support to arbitration, the Court finds that the instant labor-management dispute does not fall within 
the scope of what appears to be a very broadly worded arbitration clause—at least it did not fall 
within the confines of Prima Paint, which requires that questions regarding defenses to the contract 
are in the first instance for the arbitrator.  Id. at 651–52.  Instead, the Court found that the trial court 
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Two Terms later, the Court advanced the cause of arbitrability and 
sounded the death knell of Wilko in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon.243  Picking up on Justice White’s concurrence in Byrd,244 the 
Court refused to extend the securities law statutory exception from Wilko 
to claims made pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, holding 
the agreement to arbitrate enforceable under the Federal Arbitration 
Act.245  Although the 1933 Act exception from Wilko was not dead yet, it 
was living on borrowed time in that the rationale for refusing a statutory 
claim exception in McMahon is equally applicable to and powerful 
regarding 1933 Act claims that were at issue in Wilko.246  The McMahon 
Court also rejected the argument that claims made pursuant to the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were 
exempt from arbitration, a view shared by the entire Court, that also runs 
counter to the notion of the existence of a statutory claims or public 
policy exception to arbitrability.247 
McMahon was thus an important pro-arbitration opinion in the sense 
that it set the stage for further curtailment of the statutory claims 
exception to arbitrability.  Symbolically, Justice O’Connor, who 
dissented so strongly in Southland, wrote the McMahon majority 
opinion.  To be fair, her view in McMahon is not inconsistent with her 
Southland view that the Act applies only in federal court proceedings 
because McMahon was federal court litigation.  But her emerging  
enthusiasm for arbitration at least looks a little odd when compared to 
her resistance to it just three years earlier. 
Justice Blackmun, as joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
dissented, arguing that the 1934 Act was sufficiently similar to the 1933 
Act such that the McMahon claim should enjoy the protection against 
arbitrability provided by Wilko.248  Scoring some points in opposition to 
                                                                                                                       
that should initially assess the scope of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement 
at issue.  Id. at 652.  The Court was unanimous, with Justice White authoring the majority opinion, 
id. at 645, and Justice Brennan concurring in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Marshall.  Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., concurring).. 
 243. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 244. 470 U.S. 213 (1985); see supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text. 
 245. 482 U.S. at 238. 
 246. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 294 (likening Wilko’s status to that of a “wounded animal 
limping across the Savannah,” sure to be attacked again after McMahon’s undercut its rationale). 
 247. 482 U.S. at 238–42 (concluding that an arbitral forum would not adequately vindicate RICO 
claims and that enforcement of the arbitration clause did not constitute a waiver of substantive rights 
under the statute). 
 248. See 482 U.S. at 243. 
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arbitration, the dissent noted that in 1975 Congress made extensive 
amendments to the 1934 Act and it appeared from the legislative history 
that “Congress did not want the amendments to overrule Wilko” and that 
“[legislative history of] an amendment to the Exchange Act suggests that 
Congress was aware of [and approved] the extension of Wilko to § 10(b) 
claims [made under the 1934 Act].”249 
Although on the losing side of this significant battle, the dissenters 
fought hard against the constriction and foreshadowed demise of Wilko.  
The dissenting opinion is longer than the majority opinion.250  But the 
decision has some reasonable jurisprudential support in seeking to treat 
all claims as equal for purposes of arbitrability.251  The decision is not so 
much one enamored of arbitration as it is a reflection of the absence of 
fear that arbitration might be too inferior a process for resolving statutory 
claims.  The Court is not hostile to arbitration, but neither is it in 
arbitration’s thrall. 
The same year, in Perry v. Thomas, the Court struck another blow 
for arbitration.  In an opinion by Justice Marshall, it compelled 
arbitration of a wage claim in the face of a state law exempting wage 
claims from arbitration.252  In effect, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Ware253 was overruled while Southland254 was affirmed, 
shoring up the strength of the pro-arbitration working majority of the 
Court just four years after the watershed Southland decision.  Perry 
continued the Court’s embrace of arbitration on the rhetorical level as 
well as making substantial citation to the Court’s recent pro-arbitration 
decisions.255  The message to even the casual reader is pretty clear: 
arbitration is generally strongly supported by the Court, even in the face 
of contrary state law. 
Perry is generally susceptible to the same bases of praise or scorn 
one might heap on Southland.  The majority, with Justices Marshall, 
Burger, Blackmun, Brennan, and White, purports to embrace mainstream 
jurisprudence but arguably neglects to consider core mainstream judicial 
concerns of federalism, state prerogatives of contract regulation, and 
                                                          
 249. Id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 250. Compare id. at 222–42 (majority opinion), with id. at 247–68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 251. See id. at 226 (majority opinion). 
 252. 482 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1987). 
 253. 414 U.S. 117 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 146–51. 
 254. 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 169–214. 
 255. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489–91. 
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legislative intent and purpose, and it reads the Arbitration Act’s text too 
broadly.256  But Perry may be better defended than Southland in that the 
California Labor Code § 229 at issue in Perry appears more directly 
aimed at arbitration257 and, thus, is in conflict with the now-deemed-
substantive federal law, while the California Franchise Investment Act at 
issue in Southland was a broader prohibition against waivers of all types, 
not solely arbitration clauses.258  Only Justices Stevens and O’Connor 
dissented, each in separate opinions.259  Justice O’Connor reiterated her 
view that the enacting Congress did not intend the Arbitration Act to 
create substantive federal law applicable to state proceedings and echoed 
Justice Stevens’ view from Southland that the Act’s own language 
permits refusal to order arbitration if there were other bases under state 
law preventing enforcement of the contract.260 
Justice Stevens made a similar argument based on legislative intent 
and purpose, and he defended an originalist notion of statutory 
interpretation even though his Southland dissent had been relatively 
dynamic in its approach to the statute.261 
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50 
years in 1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even 
considered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted state-created 
rights.  It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively 
rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress 
certainly did not intend.262 
Whatever the merits of the pro- and anti-arbitration perspectives 
clashing in Perry, it seems odd that the majority did so little to defend its 
position against the contention that it had been unfaithful to the 
legislative intent and purpose of the law as well as the rights of the 
sovereign states to regulate contractual undertakings.  In essence, the 
                                                          
 256. See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous 
Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal For Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 874–75 
(2002). 
 257. See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 229 (West 2011) (specifically stating that actions for payment 
of wages may be maintained “without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate”). 
 258. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 259. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493–96 (Stevens, J. and O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 260. See id. at 493 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 261. Id. at 493–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 200. 
 262. 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to his Southland dissent and also contending 
that “the States’ power to except certain categories of disputes from arbitration should be preserved 
unless Congress decides otherwise”). 
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Perry majority rests on the analysis of Southland, which makes Perry 
subject to the same criticisms and the same concern that enthusiasm for 
arbitration has overwhelmed the Court’s ordinary concern about the 
intent and goals of the enacting Congress and protection of the states. 
In what could be regarded as a retreat from its ordinary preference 
for arbitration, the Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University held that where a 
contract containing an arbitration clause also selects specific state law as 
applicable to the dispute, the state’s law regulating arbitration 
agreements supplants the Federal Arbitration Act.263  In this case, that 
meant that California state law restrictions on arbitration were not 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and could prohibit enforcement 
of an arbitration agreement that was otherwise enforceable under federal 
law.264  The decision prompted the ire of Justice Brennan, who dissented 
with Justice Marshall and contended that the ruling was a threat to the 
overall enforceability of the federal law.265  The dissent’s argument is 
that most of the same contracts that contain arbitration clauses contain 
choice-of-law clauses as well.266  Consequently, the dissent saw the 
decision as a threat to the enforcement of a host of arbitration 
agreements, seeming to overlook that contract drafters could easily write 
their way around any potential problems by providing that federal law 
controlled questions of arbitrability.  Although the dissent may be 
consistent with Justice Brennan’s generally pro-arbitration views, it 
seems inconsistent with dissents in other cases.  In any event, Volt as a 
whole suggests some limits on the Court’s arbitral infatuation of the 
1980s. 
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American/Express, Inc., the 
Court completed the process begun in Byrd and McMahon and formally 
overruled Wilko.267  The Court had now eliminated the rationale for 
recognizing a statutory claims exception to arbitration as well as for 
making 1933 Act claims subject to arbitration.268  Although the arbitral 
exceptions for Title VII, FLSA, and § 1983 claims in prior case law were 
not overturned, they appeared to be in jeopardy. 
                                                          
 263. 489 U.S. 468, 477–78 (1989). 
 264. See id. at 470. 
 265. See id. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor did not participate in the 
decision.  Id. at 479 (majority opinion). 
 266. Id. at 479 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 267. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
 268. See id. 
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But in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court reaffirmed 
its apparently continuing commitment to these public policy exceptions 
to arbitrability by distinguishing them from Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) claims, for which the Court found no such 
exception.269  Notwithstanding the arguable support for exceptions from 
arbitration for Title VII, FLSA, and § 1983 claims, arbitral infatuation is 
dramatically present and ascendant in Gilmer.270  The case involved a 
securities industry employee making an ADEA claim against the 
brokerage house that fired him at age sixty-two.271  The Gilmer majority, 
in an opinion by Justice White, treats the case as simply one of whether a 
statutory exception exists for ADEA claims and determines the answer is 
“no,” as per Rodriguez, McMahon, and Mitsubishi.272 
The Court gave only glancing attention, in part because the issue was 
raised late in the proceedings by Gilmer’s amici,273 to a much stronger 
argument contending that the Act itself, in its clear text, states that 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts are not enforceable, at least 
for workers engaged in interstate commerce.274 
Rather than simply refusing to consider the section 1 argument 
because of waiver, the Gilmer majority used a bit of linguistic sleight of 
hand to avoid the issue: 
In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 
exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not 
contained in a contract of employment.  The FAA requires that the 
arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.  The record before us 
does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer’s 
                                                          
 269. 500 U.S. 20, 33–35 (1991). 
 270. E.g., id. at 30 (“[G]eneralized attacks on arbitration . . . are ‘far out of step with our current 
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration].’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 
490 U.S. at 481)). 
 271. Id. at 23. 
 272. Id. at 23, 26. 
 273. See id. at 24 n.2 (“Several amici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that [section 1 of the 
Act] excludes from the coverage of the FAA all ‘contracts of employment.’  Gilmer, however, did 
not raise the issue in the courts below, it was not addressed there, and it was not among the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari.”). 
 274. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2008) (“[N]othing herein contained [in the Act] shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”).  Although an individual worker may be engaged in interstate commerce, he 
or she might not be part of a class of workers regularly engaged in such commerce.  Gilmer, 
however, as a stock broker, surely fell within a common-sense meaning of the words of section 1 in 
that securities brokers, dealers, agents, and sales and servicing employees most certainly are as a 
group engaged in interstate commerce because of the nature of financial markets and the common 
use of wire, mail, and telephone communications as part of their activities. 
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employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration 
clause.  Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer’s securities 
registration application, which is a contract with the securities 
exchanges, not with Interstate.  The lower courts addressing the issue 
uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the 
FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration 
applications. . . . Unlike the dissent, we choose to follow the plain 
language of the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold 
that § 1’s exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer’s arbitration 
agreement.  Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by 
amici curiae.275 
The Gilmer majority’s dismissive language begs the question of how 
an arbitration clause can be sufficiently subject to the Act to be 
enforceable by the employer if it is not contained in a contract between 
the employer and employee.  The success of the securities industry in 
requiring that all its licensed brokers sign arbitration agreements would 
logically make out a stronger case for extending section 1 protections to 
those workers, who clearly must submit to the arbitration clause as a 
condition of employment and where there is no reasonable alternative.276  
Instead, the Gilmer Court defined the problem away through a legal 
fiction. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, who raised troubling objections to the 
Court’s embrace of arbitration rather than federalism or legislative 
history in Southland,277 offered a rather devastating rebuttal.278  He 
pointed out that the Court on many occasions has not strictly enforced 
the concept of waiver in order to render a full assessment of a case before 
it.279  He then noted the narrowness of the Court’s concept of what 
constitutes a “contract of employment:” 
                                                          
 275. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 n.2 (citations omitted).  “Another day” came a decade later when the 
Court decided Circuit City.  532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that even where the arbitration 
agreement was in a direct contract between employer and employee asserting a Title VII claim, 
section 1’s exclusion was inapplicable because the employee, a retail electronics salesperson and 
manager, was not part of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce); see infra notes 320–28 
and accompanying text. 
 276. See id. at 23 (noting that Gilmer was required by his employer to register with several stock 
exchanges, his uniform application for registration provided for arbitration, and the New York Stock 
Exchange has a rule providing for arbitration for registered representatives). 
 277. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding “no 
evidence” that Congress intended to treat a state’s definition of “invalid as contrary to public policy” 
differently than the federal government’s with respect to the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement). 
 278. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 279. See id. at 37. 
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Given that the FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration 
agreements between employees and employers, I see no reason to limit 
this exclusion from coverage to arbitration clauses contained in 
agreements entitled “Contract of Employment.”  In this case, the parties 
conceded at oral argument that Gilmer had no “contract of 
employment” as such with respondent.  Gilmer was, however, required 
as a condition of his employment to become a registered representative 
of several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE)  Just because his agreement to arbitrate any “dispute, claim or 
controversy” with his employer that arose out of the employment 
relationship was contained in his application for registration before the 
NYSE rather than in a specific contract of employment with his 
employer, I do not think that Gilmer can be compelled pursuant to the 
FAA to arbitrate his employment-related dispute.  Rather, in my 
opinion the exclusion in § 1 should be interpreted to cover any 
agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the employer 
arising out of the employment relationship, particularly where such 
agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.280 
On the issue of the meaning of section 1, Justice Stevens marshals 
equally compelling evidence of legislative intent to protect vulnerable 
workers from unwanted arbitration agreements when they are seeking 
work.281  Although the legislative history focused on workers who were 
constantly and visibly involved in physical movement across state lines, 
this was a mere consequence of the involvement of the Seaman’s Union 
during the legislative process, which understandably used seamen as 
their paradigmatic example of workers who should not be unfairly 
saddled with nonconsensual arbitration agreements.282 
Although the discussion of the employment exception in Gilmer is 
necessarily truncated, it foreshadows the Court’s ultimate unfortunate, 
crabbed reading of section 1 in Circuit City, Inc. v. Adams.283  In taking a 
narrow view of section 1, the Court downplayed the text of the Act, 
congressional intent, statutory purpose, and the federalism concerns of 
the states in protecting workers from potentially unfair tribunals that 
                                                          
 280. Id. at 40.  Justice Stevens then marshaled history and precedent supporting a broad reading 
of the term “contract of employment” with respect to the Act.  Id. at 40–41 (noting that collective-
bargaining agreements have fit into the section 1 exclusion). 
 281. See id. at 41–42. 
 282. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 259, 263–64 (reviewing the origin of the statutory provision and case law and arguing for a 
construction of section 1 applicable to all workers involved in interstate commerce, rather than the 
narrow railroad–trucker–seaman-only construction provided by some courts). 
 283. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); see infra notes 320–28 and accompanying text. 
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might be imposed upon the workers without their consent due to the 
great leverage held by employers.284 
There is of course a jurisprudential inconsistency in the Court’s 
broad and aggressive reading of section 2 of the Act regarding the 
enforceability of arbitration coupled with the Court’s very narrow 
reading of section 1 of the Act protecting employees from compelled 
arbitration.  Logically, section 1 should receive the same interpretative 
treatment as does section 2.  Given the legislative intent and statutory 
purpose of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements between 
merchants and halting judicial reluctance to specifically enforce clearly 
consensual arbitration clauses, there is nothing inconsistent with a pro-
arbitration view of the Act that also recognizes that the Act does not 
extend its support of arbitration to the employment context. 
Despite the tangential treatment of section 1 in Gilmer, the decision, 
with only Justices Stevens and Marshall in dissent, suggests a Court 
becoming more committed to arbitration as a process and willing to 
depart from standard statutory construction to support this favored 
process.  Ironically, however, the same Court that was moving toward a 
narrow view of section 1 and the degree of interstate activity required to 
protect workers from unwanted pre-dispute arbitration clauses took a 
broad view of interstate commerce regarding the reach of the Act 
generally in its next case. 
In a divided opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. 
Dobson, the Court held that the Arbitration Act reaches as broadly as the 
limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.285  The 
division of the Court revolves around more technical issues of language 
and procedure rather than basic orientation toward the Act.286  The 
decision supports arbitration but was hardly a shocking break with 
expectations, at least in light of the fact that the Act had been considered 
substantive law for ten years since Southland and that the Court had 
given a broad construction to the concept of interstate commerce at least 
since the New Deal.287  Dobson continued the Court’s support for 
                                                          
 284. See id. at 109 (“[T]he better interpretation is to construe the statute . . . to confine the 
exemption to transportation workers.”). 
 285. 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995). 
 286. The concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor and the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas argue that the Act should not apply in state courts; they do not argue against the breadth 
of section 2.  See id. at 282–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 284–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. 
at 285–97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 287. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding Congress 
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arbitration but is a defensible decision that simply looks bad when 
juxtaposed with the Court’s unwillingness to give pro-employee section 
1 the same treatment accorded the Act generally. 
Nonetheless, Justices Scalia and Thomas were moved to dissent (at 
length in the case of Justice Thomas), arguing that Southland was 
wrongly decided.288  By this juncture, however, Justice O’Connor 
appeared to have thrown in the towel.289  She still thought Southland was 
wrongly decided but acknowledged its precedential authority and 
concurred in the Dobson decision.290 
As discussed below, Dodson was hardly the end of the Court’s 
“effort to expand the Federal Arbitration Act.”291  That would await 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement and the personnel changes of the Roberts 
Court, which produced more infatuatedly and dramatically divisive pro-
arbitration opinions restricting class action litigation and even class 
action arbitration.292 
During the same year Dodson was decided, the Court in 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., refused to limit the 
arbitrator’s authority to award punitive damages in a case that turned 
largely on choice-of-law principles and the peculiar New York rule that 
punitive damages could not be awarded in arbitration.293  The decision is 
pro-arbitration in that it favors greater remedial powers for arbitrators, 
although that would not have been the case had the agreement in 
question properly imported New York substantive law.  But the decision 
is also pro-consumer in that it provides the prospect of greater remedies 
in the arbitrations into which more and more matters are being 
funneled.294 
On the whole, Mastrobuono is not a moment when the Court’s 
infatuation with arbitration is on display—the case is resolved on more 
technocratic grounds.295  The uncontroversial nature of the ruling is 
                                                                                                                       
has the power to control activities that have a “close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce”). 
 288. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I agree with respondents . . . that 
Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act.”); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“In my view, [stare decisis] is insufficient to save Southland.”). 
 289. See id. at 283–84 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See infra Part III.D. 
 293. 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995). 
 294. See id. at 61–64. 
 295. The Court based its decision on common law rules for contract interpretation, not on public 
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reflected in the 8–1 vote of the Court, with Justice Thomas dissenting on 
the ground that the choice-of-law provision at issue in the case is not 
materially different than the one in Volt, which required application of 
California law at odds with the federal common law of arbitration.296  
Justice Thomas saw the New York law sought by the brokerage house as 
insufficiently different to avoid the reach of New York’s prohibition on 
punitive damages in arbitration.297 
In another 1995 decision, the Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. 
v. Kaplan, reaffirmed the general rule that, notwithstanding the federal 
policy favoring arbitration, the question of whether an agreement 
requires arbitration is for the courts and not the arbitrator.298  By contrast, 
general questions going to the contract as a whole are initially for the 
arbitrators as provided in Prima Paint and its progeny.299  The actual 
decision-making in such cases turns on whether a party resisting 
arbitration has a challenge to the arbitration agreement itself or merely a 
defense to the contract as a whole or some portion of the contract other 
than the arbitration clause.300  The Court held that “because the Kaplans 
did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, 
the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the  
dispute was subject to independent review by the courts.”301  Regarding 
standards of review, the First Options Court unanimously held that: 
[T]here is no special standard governing [appellate] review of a district 
court’s decision [to confirm or vacate an arbitration award].  Rather, 
review of, for example, a district court decision confirming an 
arbitration award on the ground that the parties agreed to submit their 
dispute to arbitration, should proceed like review of any other district 
court decision finding an agreement between parties, e.g., accepting 
findings of fact that are not “clearly erroneous” but deciding questions 
of law de novo.302 
                                                                                                                       
policy rationales supporting arbitration.  Id. at 62. 
 296. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
470 (1989); see supra notes 263–66 and accompanying text (discussing Volt). 
 297. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 
Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (forbidding award of punitive damages in arbitration), 
superseded by statute, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2006). 
 298. 514 U.S. 938, 944–47 (1995). 
 299. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–07 (1967); see also 
First Options, 514 U.S. at 945–46. 
 301. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947. 
 302. Id. at 947–48. 
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In addition to being a middle-of-the-road, uneventful decision, First 
Options tends to avoid the excesses of arbitral infatuation in its rhetoric, 
approach, and decision, and it stands as a moment of relative lack of 
passion by the Court regarding arbitration.  But in another decision from 
that year, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, the Court 
reverted to its pro-arbitration amore in refusing to apply the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) to prevent arbitration of a dispute in Japan 
pursuant to a clause in a bill of lading for a shipment of oranges from 
Morocco to Boston, which also included a Japanese choice-of-law 
provision.303  COGSA provides that: 
[a]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving 
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in 
connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in 
the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such 
liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and 
void and of no effect.304 
Given a plain reading, COGSA would appear to foreclose imposition 
of an arbitration agreement if arbitration resulted in any shrinkage of 
claimant remedies.  But the Court majority avoided this seeming 
command by holding that the arbitration and choice-of-law clauses were  
not provisions “lessening . . . liability.”305  Justice Stevens explained in 
dissent: 
The foreign-arbitration clause imposes potentially prohibitive costs on 
the shipper, who must travel—and bring his lawyers, witnesses, and 
exhibits—to a distant country in order to seek redress. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
The Court assumes that the words “lessening such liability” must be 
narrowly construed to refer only to the substantive rules that define the 
carrier’s legal obligations.  Under this view, contractual provisions that 
lessen the amount of the consignee’s net recovery, or that lessen the 
likelihood that it will make any recovery at all, are [erroneously placed] 
beyond the scope of the statute. 
In my opinion, this view is flatly inconsistent with the purpose of 
                                                          
 303. 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995). 
 304. 46 U.S.C. App. § 1303(8) (2002) (current version recodified in notes for section of 46 
U.S.C. 30701 (2006)). 
 305. Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. at 536–37. 
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COGSA § 3(8).306 
  
                                                          
 306. Id. at 549–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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In effect, the majority, through its minimization of the practical 
impact of the arbitration clause’s dictating a distant and inconvenient 
forum and distant applicable law, held that COGSA, enacted in 1936—a 
decade after the Act—was trumped by the Act, notwithstanding that 
COGSA is as much substantive law as the Act.  Further, the case 
presented a rather sympathetic shipper forced to adhere to a one-sided 
contract that might well fail unconscionability analysis under state law.  
As Justice Stevens’ dissent noted, COGSA was enacted to correct such 
problems.307 
Once again reviewing section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
makes arbitration clauses specifically enforceable “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”308 
Justice Stevens observed that: 
[t]his language plainly intends to place arbitration clauses upon the 
same footing as all other contractual clauses.  Thus, like any clause, an 
arbitration clause is enforceable, “save upon such grounds” as would 
suffice to invalidate any other, nonarbitration clause.  The FAA thereby 
fulfills its policy of jettisoning the prior regime of hostility to 
arbitration.  Like any other contractual clause, then, an arbitration 
clause may be invalid without violating the FAA if, for example, it is 
procured through fraud or forgery; there is mutual mistake or 
impossibility; the provision is unconscionable; or, as in this case, the 
terms of the clause are illegal under a separate federal statute which 
does not evidence a hostility to arbitration.  Neither the terms nor the 
policies of the FAA would be thwarted if the Court were to hold today 
that a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading “lessens liability” 
under COGSA.  COGSA does not single out arbitration clauses for 
disfavored treatment; it invalidates any clause that lessens the carrier’s 
liability.  Illegality under COGSA is therefore an independent ground 
“for the revocation of any contract,” under FAA § 2.  There is no 
conflict between the two federal statutes.309 
Justice Stevens attributed the majority’s error to “overzealous 
formalism,”310 but the decision appears just as much to be a preference 
for arbitration regardless of the text, intent, or purpose of the Act—a 
preference embraced by the Court in spite of the Act’s direction that 
arbitration agreements be subject to the same contract-based defenses to 
                                                          
 307. Id. at 550; see also id. at 545–46 (noting academic support for enforcing COGSA and 
similar precedent authored by respected Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly). 
 308. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 309. Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. at 555–56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 310. Id. at 556. 
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enforcement listed by Justice Stevens.  Just as disturbingly, Justice 
Stevens dissented alone.  A supermajority of the Court was sufficiently 
infatuated by arbitration that it pursued it even in the face of contrary 
substantive law. 
Similar substantive preferences for arbitration over states’ rights, 
federalism, and the right to regulate were reflected a year later in 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.311  A Subway sandwich shop 
franchisee sought to avoid arbitration of his dispute with the franchisor 
based on the failure of the arbitration clause in the agreement to comply 
with the requirements of a Montana statute, which provided that 
“[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration . . . shall be typed in 
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such 
notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to 
arbitration.” 312 
Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
the provision was in violation of the Arbitration Act because the state 
law did not apply to the revocation of “any” contract but only to 
arbitration agreements.313  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion enjoyed a 
supermajority, with only Justice Thomas in dissent, reiterating his view 
that Southland was wrongly decided.314 
Notwithstanding the strength of the Court’s vote and its consistency 
with federal appeals court decisions taking a similarly dim view of 
analogous state laws, Casarotto reads like an opinion written by a court 
in the sway of arbitration and wishing to promote it in spite of legitimate 
countervailing state goals.  The Montana statute is not a ban on specific 
enforcement of arbitration clauses but simply a means of forcing 
disclosure to attempt to ensure that arbitration agreements are 
consensual. 
The Montana law was vulnerable to preemption by the Act because it 
singled out arbitration.  But this presumably reflected state concern that 
arbitration agreements presented particularly pressing problems of 
disclosure, consent, and fairness.  A Court less infatuated with arbitration 
could have respected the traditional state domain of contract law and 
been consistent with the Act.  Although the state statute placed an 
additional burden on the drafters of arbitration agreements, the burden is 
                                                          
 311. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 312. Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (amended 1997)). 
 313. Id. at 688. 
 314. Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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light, merely requiring a disclosure provision rather than imposing a 
substantive bar to arbitration.  Further, a Court less driven to require 
arbitration could have considered other contract-based defenses to 
arbitrability and whether Montana’s information-forcing statute was 
simply a form of similar state-centered policing of contracts.315 
After a four-year break from arbitration cases, the new century saw 
the Court return to the topic and largely continue its pro-arbitration 
approach.316  In Green Tree Financial Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, the 
Court ruled that an arbitration agreement that does not specifically set 
forth information about the costs and fees of arbitration is nonetheless 
enforceable.317  The Court in effect rejected the view that such silence 
was per se unconscionable as a matter of federal common law.318  Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, concurred in 
part and dissented in part, arguing that instead of making a definitive 
pronouncement on the issue, the Court should have remanded the case 
for “closer consideration of the arbitral forum’s accessibility” and 
potential unconscionability in light of the lack of disclosure about costs 
and fees.319  This decision continued the Court’s affection for arbitration 
and reflected some division within the Court as well as the Court’s 
overall resistance to unconscionability analysis. 
Then came Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, in which the Court 
expressly addressed the issue it had dodged in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., albeit hinting at a bad result for workers 
whenever forced to face the issues squarely.  The Circuit City Court 
ruled that section 1 of the Act, which prohibits enforcement of arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts, did not apply to all workers engaged in 
activity affecting commerce but only applied to those directly involved in 
the interstate movement of goods.320  In reaching this result, the Court 
                                                          
 315. See Stephen Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 31WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1996) (advocating a contractual approach to issues 
of unconscionability in arbitration). 
 316. In Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., a unanimous and 
uncontroversial decision, the Court held that the venue provisions of the Arbitration Act are 
permissive and allow a motion for confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration award to be 
filed either in the federal district court where the award was made or in any other federal district 
court where venue is proper under the general venue statute.  529 U.S. 193, 195 (2000) 
 317. 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000). 
 318. Id. at 89–92. 
 319. See id. at 93–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have considered 
Green Tree’s practice under the form contract and the financial inaccessibility of the arbitral forum 
to Randolph). 
 320. See 532 U.S. 105, 112, 119 (2001) (stating that most courts of appeal limit the exclusion 
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took a narrow construction of section 1 and limited its protections to 
transportation workers.321 
As he had in Gilmer, Justice Stevens dissented, this time enjoying 
support from Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter.322  As in Gilmer, 
Justice Stevens reviewed the legislative history of the Act and 
convincingly showed a congressional desire to protect workers subject to 
contracts of adhesion that contain arbitration clauses.323  Although the 
language of section 1 could have been broader, it not only singles out 
seamen and railroad workers, but it includes the catchall of “any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”324—
language broad enough to encompass workers involved in non-
transportation activities implicating interstate commerce.  Early cases 
construing section 1 took this view, and it was not until Tenney 
Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical & Machine Workers of America,  
Local 437 that a contrary view arose in the circuits,325 creating a split at 
the time of the Circuit City decision. 
In addition to criticizing the majority’s pre-arbitration reading of 
section 1, Justice Stevens made a persuasive case that the majority 
ignored both the congressional intent and legislative purpose underlying 
the statute: 
It is not necessarily wrong for the Court to put its own imprint on a 
statute.  But when its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text 
enables it to disregard countervailing considerations that were 
expressed by Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid 
today, the Court misuses its authority.  As the history of the legislation 
indicates, the potential disparity in bargaining power between 
individual employees and large employers was the source of organized 
labor’s opposition to the Act, which it feared would require courts to 
enforce unfair employment contracts. . . . When the Court simply 
ignores the interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its 
interpretation with its own policy preferences. 
. . . A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, 
and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a 
                                                                                                                       
provision to employees actually moving goods in interstate commerce and adopting this as the 
appropriate interpretation); see supra text accompanying notes 270–84 (discussing Gilmer). 
 321. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. 
 322. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 323. See id. at 125–29 (reviewing legislative history of section 1 of the Act). 
 324. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 325. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1954); see Stempel, supra note 282 (providing a detailed description 
of the case law of section 1 prior to Gilmer and Circuit City). 
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court’s own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the 
very purpose for which a provision was enacted.  That is the sad result 
in this case.326 
Justice Souter’s dissent, also joined by the other three dissenters, 
noted the difficult-to-defend inconsistency between the Court’s broad 
construction of section 2, which makes arbitration agreements 
specifically enforceable save for contract-based revocation defenses, and 
the Court’s narrow construction of section 1 so as to limit employee 
protection to only transportation workers.327 
The dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Souter persuasively 
argue that the Circuit City majority largely turned its back on legislative 
history considerations in favor of reading statutory text in an unnatural 
manner designed to implement the majority’s policy preference for 
arbitration of employment disputes.328  In effect, the four dissenters 
accuse the five Justices in the majority of spurning traditional statutory 
interpretation jurisprudence that all of the majority judges—Justices 
Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas—profess to 
embrace, instead favoring imposition of the majority’s personal 
preferences for private ordering and reduced litigation. 
After a period of relative quiet on the arbitration front,329 the Court 
returned to the issue in substantial, but confusing, fashion in 2003 with 
the decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.330  Reviewing state 
                                                          
 326. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 327. Id. at 133–35. 
 328. Id. at 131; id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 329. The 2002–2003 time period broke the mold slightly with one decision favorable to workers 
suffering discrimination.  In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Stevens, held that an arbitration agreement between an employee and his restaurant employer did not 
bind the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from seeking relief in court for the 
employee  because the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration clause or its container contract.  534 
U.S. 279, 297–98 (2002).  Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, objected, 
arguing that the Act required enforceability and that the EEOC was bound by the agreements made 
by the plaintiffs whose causes it may take up in litigation.  See id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Two other decisions, however, continued to be highly supportive of arbitrability.  In Howsam 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,  the Court held that the meaning of a limitation provision in the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration Procedure was a matter to 
be determined by the arbitrator rather than the court.  537 U.S. 79, 84–85 (2002).  In Citizens Bank v. 
Alafarbco, Inc., the Court’s per curiam opinion followed Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 
holding that debt restructuring agreements made in Alabama between Alabama residents nonetheless 
had a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to fall within the Act.  Alafarbco, 539 U.S. 52, 
55–56 (2003); Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  The Court found agreements were contracts 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce within the meaning of the Act.  Id. at 56. 
 330. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
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court decisions permitting an arbitrator to accord class action treatment 
to homeowners contending that their commercial lender had violated the 
South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, the Court vacated the South 
Carolina high court’s ruling, holding that although the Federal 
Arbitration Act did not clearly preclude class arbitration, the matter 
required more scrutiny according to state contract law.331  The decision is 
odd and seems not to accomplish much other than falling short of finding 
a wholesale prohibition on class arbitration in the Act.  To that extent, it 
is not particularly indicative of either affection for or opposition to 
arbitration.  Surprisingly, the decision engendered dissents by Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy,332 and Justice 
Thomas,333 as well as a concurrence and dissent by Justice Stevens.334 
Justice Stevens would have simply affirmed, in part because the 
petitioner did not appear to preserve a challenge to this issue of whether 
the state courts improperly decided a question of class arbitration that 
should have been for the arbitrator in the first instance.335  Justice 
Thomas again reiterated his view that Southland was wrongly decided.336  
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy thought reversal was the apt 
remedy because the matter was one for the courts rather than the 
arbitrator, and in their view, the contract in question did not permit class 
arbitration, making the state court decision a violation of the federal 
Act.337 
D. The Roberts Court: A More Tainted Kind of Love 
From the uncertainty of Bazzle, the Court returned to more obvious 
policy preference for arbitration in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna.338  In Buckeye, the Court addressed a variant of the Prima 
Paint issue of allocation of initial interpretative authority between the 
courts and arbitrators.339  The Court held that the issue of whether an 
allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration clause was illegal 
                                                          
 331. See id. at 453–54. 
 332. Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 333. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 334. Id. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 335. See id. at 455. 
 336. See id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 337. See id. at 456 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 338. 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 339. See id. at 444–45 (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 
(1967)); supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (same). 
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and thus void and unenforceable was for the arbitrator to decide,340 a 
result that can be justified under Prima Paint even if incorrect or unwise.  
Buckeye is thus an example of continued affection for arbitration and a 
desire to keep more dispute resolution activity before the arbitrator rather 
than the courts.  But it is not an outrageous example of the Court 
swooning over arbitration.  Justice Thomas was again a voice in the 
wilderness, contending that the Act, if properly interpreted, applies only 
in federal courts.341  Justice Alito did not participate.342 
More obvious substantive favoritism of arbitration was reflected in 
Preston v. Ferrer, in which the Court, with Justice Thomas in lone 
dissent,343  held that the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes state law that 
would in the absence of arbitration rest primary jurisdiction over a 
dispute in an administrative forum.344  The Court viewed the state law 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to 
arbitration as an obstacle to arbitration in conflict with the federal Act.345 
Ironically, the case involved a dispute between a television “judge” 
and his attorney/agent.346  The judge sought to have the matter 
determined by the California Labor Commissioner rather than an 
arbitrator.347  The California appellate court supported this request, 
finding Buckeye Check Cashing inapposite because there had been no 
question of primary administrative agency jurisdiction in Buckeye.348  
The Court rejected the distinction in an opinion that continued the 
Court’s infatuation with arbitration but that was no more pro-arbitration 
than the existing Prima Paint and Buckeye precedents. 
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., arguably takes the pro-
arbitration sentiment of the Court further by preventing parties to an 
arbitration agreement from consensually expanding judicial review of 
arbitration.349  Hall Street held that parties to an arbitration agreement 
could not stipulate to more searching judicial review of any resulting 
                                                          
 340. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445–47. 
 341. See id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 342. Id. at 441 (majority opinion). 
 343. 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (restating the argument that the Act did 
not apply in state court proceedings). 
 344. Id. at 349–51 (majority opinion). 
 345. See id. at 360–63. 
 346. Id. at 350. 
 347. Id. at 350–51. 
 348. See Ferrer v. Preston, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634 (Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 552 U.S. 346, 346 
(2008). 
 349. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578. 
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award, in particular de novo review of the arbitrator’s legal 
determinations rather than the more limited menu of grounds for vacating 
an award set forth in section 10 of the Act.350  The Court viewed this as 
improper attempts by disputants to change the applicable law or to 
attempt to control the courts.351 
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer dissented.352 All essentially 
argued that the Arbitration Act did not preclude agreements to enlarge 
the scope of review.  Justice Stevens noted that there was precedent 
permitting such agreements prior to the Act and that neither the text nor 
the legislative history of the Act suggested that Congress intended to 
overturn these precedents.353  Hall Street, however interesting, does not 
give a clear signal regarding the Court’s preferences for arbitration over 
litigation.  But the decision appears to strengthen the power of arbitration 
by preventing judicial review in excess of that provided by section 10 of 
the Act rather than protect the courts from litigants’ efforts to control the 
courts’ discharge of statutory duty. 
After two relatively minor decisions in 2009,354 the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence took increasingly wrong turns in 2010 and 
2011.  With Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the 
Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence became particularly problematic 
and unsatisfying, in part because its romance with arbitration began to 
appear fickle, or at least compromised of favoritism depending on who 
was pursuing arbitration combined with a significant but unfounded 
aversion to class action treatment of cases.355 
In Stolt-Nielsen, a customer sought class action proceedings in its 
arbitration with the shipper when accusing the shipper of illegal price 
                                                          
 350. Id. at 586. 
 351. See id. at 590–92. 
 352. See id. at 592 (Stevens, J. and Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 596 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 353. See id. at 595 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 354. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Court held that judges may look through a petition to 
compel arbitration to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter rather than relying 
solely on the averments of the petition.  556 U.S. 49, 53–54 (2009).  Vaden is thus probably more of 
a vindication of judicial authority than a reflection of arbitral infatuation.  In Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, the Court held that an entity or person not party to the underlying agreement containing an 
arbitration clause nonetheless had standing to request a stay of court action on a matter pending in 
arbitration.  129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009).  By expanding standing to seek judicial relief in support 
of arbitration, the decision continued the Court’s tendency to embrace arbitration.  Justice Souter, as 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, dissented on grounds that the matter was not 
ripe for appeal but appeared not to disagree with the majority’s substantive decision regarding the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  See id. at 1903–04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 355. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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fixing.356  The arbitration clause of the shipping contract used broad 
language, and no one contested that the matter was subject to 
arbitration.357  But the shipper opposed class action treatment of the 
claim.358  The appointed arbitrators considered the issue and, after a 
hearing, determined the parties should proceed with class treatment of 
the case, though they stayed the proceedings pending judicial review.359 
The federal district court vacated this “award” on the ground that the 
arbitrators had shown “manifest disregard” of the law because they had 
failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.360  The Second Circuit 
reversed and reinstated the arbitration panel decision.361  The Supreme 
Court vacated the decision to proceed on a class basis, holding that class  
treatment was improper absent sufficient proof that the shipper had 
affirmatively consented to class action arbitration.362 
Stolt-Nielsen, a relatively close 6–3 decision, could be viewed as 
curtailing the Court’s general affinity for arbitration.  The decision has 
the immediate practical effect of limiting an arbitration panel’s power 
over a dispute.  But Stolt-Nielsen reflects not so much a cooling of 
arbitral ardor as a revelation that the Court’s love of arbitration is a 
reckless and irresponsible affair.  In most of the post-Southland cases, 
the Court has given no serious consideration to issues of consent in the 
formation of an arbitration agreement.  But in Stolt-Nielsen, where the 
party resisting broader arbitration held greater commercial power and the 
relief requested would empower claimants, the Court was suddenly 
gripped with concern over whether sufficient consent to arbitrate 
existed.363 
Perhaps the Court hates antitrust claimants or class action treatment 
of disputes even more than it loves arbitration.  But this hardly makes for 
sound adjudication.  Rather, it exposes the Court’s own inconsistency 
and favoritism.  More sound and persuasive is Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, 
which Justices Stevens and Breyer joined.364  In addition to making the 
                                                          
 356. Id. at 1764–65. 
 357. See id. at 1765. 
 358. Id. 
 359. See id. at 1766. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See id. at 1767–68. 
 363. See id. at 1773–75 (emphasizing “consensual nature of private dispute resolution” and that 
“a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a 
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”). 
 364. See id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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argument that the matter was not a final award subject to review under 
section 10,365 the dissent took the sensible view that an arbitration 
agreement ordinarily carries with it an agreement to arbitrate according 
to whatever rules govern the proceeding as applied by the arbitrators: 
Even if [the shipper] had a plea ripe for judicial review, the Court 
should reject it on the merits.  Recall that the parties jointly asked the 
arbitrator to decide, initially, whether the arbitration clause in their 
shipping contracts permitted class proceedings.  The panel did just what 
it was commissioned to do.  It construed the broad arbitration clause 
(covering “[a]ny dispute arising from the making, performance or 
termination of this Charter Party,” and ruled, expressly and only, that 
the clause permitted class arbitration.  The Court acts without warrant 
in allowing Stolt-Nielsen essentially to repudiate its submission of the 
contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and to gain, in place 
of the arbitrators’ judgment, this Court’s de novo determination. 
The controlling FAA prescription, § 10(a), authorizes a court to 
vacate an arbitration panel’s decision “only in very unusual 
circumstances.”366 
As the dissent also accurately noted, the majority unfairly and 
inaccurately characterized the arbitration panel decision as being one of 
policy preference for class action treatment despite that the words 
“policy” or “public policy” were “not so much as mentioned” by the 
panel, which instead “tied its conclusion that the arbitration clause 
permitted class arbitration” on contract language, historical practices, 
applicable rules, and the record as informed by expert testimony.367 
“The question properly before the Court is not whether the 
arbitrators’ ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded 
their powers’ [under section 10(a)(4)].  The arbitrators decided a 
threshold issue, explicitly committed to them, about the procedural mode 
                                                          
 365. See id. at 1778.  The majority emphasized consent and noted that “a party may not be 
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so.”  Id. at 1774–75 (majority opinion).  The dissent 
responded by arguing that “[t]he Court . . . does not persuasively justify judicial intervention so early 
in the game, or convincingly reconcile its adjudication with the firm final-judgment rule prevailing 
in the federal court system.”  Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg additionally 
noted that “[n]o decision of this Court, until today, has ever approved immediate judicial review of 
an arbitrator’s decision, as preliminary as the ‘partial award’ made in this case.”  Id. at 1779 
(footnote omitted). 
 366. Id. at 1779–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 367. See id. at 1780–81. 
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available for presentation of AnimalFeeds’ antitrust claims.”368  Making 
good use of the Court’s then-recent opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. that had permitted class action 
litigation against an Erie challenge, 369 the dissent, quoting Shady Grove, 
noted that “‘rules allowing multiple claims (and claims by or against 
multiple parties) to be litigated together . . . neither change plaintiffs’ 
separate entitlements to relief nor abridge defendants’ rights; they alter 
only how the claims are processed.’”370  The author of Shady Grove was 
Justice Scalia, a member of the Stolt-Nielsen majority.371 
Succinctly noting the logical flaw in the reasoning of the Stolt-
Nielsen majority, the dissent observed that “[f]or arbitrators to consider 
whether a claim should proceed on a class basis, the Court apparently 
demands contractual language one can read as affirmatively authorizing 
class arbitration.  The breadth of the arbitration clause, and the absence 
of any provision waiving or banning class proceedings, will not do.”372  
But the law of arbitrability as set forth in the Court’s pre-Stolt-Nielsen 
cases of the modern era has been broad construction of broadly worded 
arbitration agreements and the presumption that, unless stated to the 
contrary, arbitration generally should be able to accord the same 
remedies that are available in litigation. 
As the dissent also noted, the right question in cases like Stolt-
Nielsen seeks “the proper default rule when there is no stipulation.”373  
Where industry-wide arbitration is the norm, one would logically expect 
the dispute resolution norm to be one of according full remedies 
commensurate with the dispute.  And, as the dissent also noted “[w]hen 
adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in 
size, class proceedings may be ‘the thin,’ i.e., without them, potential 
claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their 
rights.”374 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court was back in 
unbridled pro-arbitration mode, holding that an arbitration clause 
challenged as unconscionable by a former employee bringing a 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination suit must first be assessed by the arbitrator 
                                                          
 368. Id. at 1781. 
 369. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 370. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 371. See id. at 1763 (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435. 
 372. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 U.S. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 373. Id. at 1783. 
 374. Id. (citations omitted). 
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rather than the court.375  The clause was broadly drafted, stating that the 
arbitrator, “and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have 
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 
applicability, enforceability or formation” of the agreement and was “not 
limited to any claim that all or any part of [the agreement was] void or 
voidable.”376  But by reading the clause broadly and literally to preclude 
judicial assessment of the fairness of the provision, the Court ignored the 
very language of section 2 of the Act, which permits contract-based 
claims for revocation of an arbitration agreement.377 
Coming less than two months after the Court’s concern in Stolt-
Nielsen over whether a large shipping company had adequately 
consented to class treatment of allegations that it had engaged in price 
fixing, it is jarring to see little or no concern over the employee’s consent 
to a clause that sought to oust courts from even the jurisdiction left to 
them by the drafters of the Act.  Similarly odd is the Rent-A-Center 
Court’s willingness to permit this when only two years earlier it was 
unwilling to permit the expanded judicial review of arbitration awards 
sought by the contracting parties in Hall Street.378  The decisions seem 
irreconcilable except by reference to a raw preference for arbitration with 
limited judicial involvement—but, under Stolt-Nielsen, for piecemeal 
arbitration of claims rather than class treatment. 
The majority’s reasoning is circular in that it prevents—until after an 
award and a section 10 challenge to the award—judicial scrutiny of the 
arbitration clause even though the worker’s very argument is that the 
clause suffers from procedural or substantive unconscionability.379  In 
particular, the arbitration clause contained a fee-sharing provision that 
the trial court determined was not substantively unconscionable and that 
had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, with other unconscionability 
arguments pending review when the Supreme Court intervened.380 
                                                          
 375. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2772–73 (2010). 
 376. Id. at 2775. 
 377. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 378. Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008).  Three days after issuing Rent-A-Center, the Court in 
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, held that a dispute over the ratification 
date of the collective bargaining agreement at issue was a matter for the court rather than an 
arbitrator, that the employer did not implicitly consent to arbitration, and that a claim of tortious 
interference fell outside the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act.  130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853, 
2863–66 (2010).  In dissent, Justices Sotomayor and Stevens argued that the CBA clearly directs 
such issues to the arbitrator.  See id. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 379. Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 380. The trial court had found no substantive unconscionability as an alternative holding should 
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its determination that the issue was for the arbitrator be disturbed on review.  Id. at 2776. 
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The Rent-A-Center majority justified its holding as a natural 
extension of Prima Paint and Buckeye, which both held that attacks on 
contracts containing arbitration clauses are for the arbitrator because 
such attacks do not question the validity of the arbitration clause.381  But 
allowing arbitrators to assess contract revocation defenses that do not 
focus on arbitration is one thing.  Allowing boilerplate arbitration 
agreements imposed on employees, who would be free of such clauses 
had the Court decided Gilmer or Circuit City correctly, is quite another. 
With Rent-A-Center, the Court made a big move toward further 
embracing arbitration.  Under Rent-A-Center, it is not enough to require 
judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses after judicial investigation 
determines that they apply to the dispute and are not subject to a 
revocation defense under section 2.382  Now, parties favoring arbitration, 
even the highly problematic mass arbitration that was foreign to the 
drafters of the Act, can remove courts from the inquiry altogether, 
restricting the judicial role to its limited authority of policing arbitration 
awards after the fact pursuant to the limited scope of section 10 of the 
Act.  That is, unless the Court takes an unjustifiably expansive view of 
section 10, as it did in Stolt-Nielsen. 
The pro-arbitration aggressiveness of Rent-A-Center engendered a 5–
4 split in the Court.383  As in so many of the Court’s arbitration decisions 
of the past twenty years, the dissenting arguments appear more consistent 
with statutory text, legislative intent and purpose, and deference to state 
contract law.384  In addition, the dissent holds truer to judicial precedent: 
The Court’s decision today goes beyond Prima Paint.  Its breezy 
assertion that the subject matter of the contract at issue—in this case, an 
arbitration agreement and nothing more—”makes no difference” is 
simply wrong.  This written arbitration agreement is but one part of a 
broader employment agreement between the parties, just as the 
arbitration clause in Prima Paint was but one part of a broader contract 
for services between those parties.  Thus, that the subject matter of the  
 
 
                                                          
 381. Id. at 2778–80; see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006); 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967); see also supra notes 
142–43 and accompanying text (discussing Prima Paint); supra notes 338–42 and accompanying 
text (discussing Buckeye). 
 382. Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 383. Id. 
 384. See id. at 2781–88 (Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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agreement is exclusively arbitration makes all the difference in the 
Prima Paint analysis.385 
At least for the moment, the Court may have saved its worst for last.  
Of the many problematic arbitration decisions that seem to run 
roughshod over settled legal principles, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion is by far the worst in its direct opposition to the Act’s text, 
legislative history, and architecture, and its disregard of the rights of the 
states to regulate contracts. 386 
Vincent and Lisa Concepcion purchased mobile phones subject to an 
AT&T Mobility (AT&T) service contract.387  And like most cell phone 
service contracts, the AT&T contract provided for arbitration, including 
the right of AT&T to “make unilateral amendments, which it did to the 
arbitration provision on several occasions.”388  The Concepcions brought 
litigation alleging AT&T improperly charged $30.22 in sales tax on the 
supposedly “free” phones they received as part of the service agreement, 
a complaint that was consolidated with a putative class action alleging 
fraud and false advertising because the company had advertised the 
phones as “free” with a service agreement.389 
AT&T in turn moved to compel arbitration of the claim.390  The 
Concepcions resisted, asserting “that the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because 
it disallowed classwide procedures.”391  Because the arbitration clause 
forbade class action treatment of claims, the trial court and the Ninth 
Circuit found it unconscionable under California law on the strength of 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court.392 
Notwithstanding that Discover Bank and earlier class action 
precedent such as Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 
Inc.393 can be characterized as unconscionability decisions in which the 
unreasonably unfair terms simply happened to be contained in an 
                                                          
 385. Id. at 2781–82 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2782 (the question of arbitrability, 
including defenses to arbitrability, is “an issue the FAA assigns to the courts”). 
 386. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 387. Id. at 1744. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 1745. 
 392. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that 
limitations on remedies such as a ban on class actions were unconscionable contract provisions)). 
 393. 6 P.3d 669, 771–72 (Cal. 2000). 
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arbitration clause,394 the Concepcion majority specifically characterized 
the California law as anti-arbitration law that was precluded by the Act: 
The question in this case is whether § 2 preempts California’s rule 
classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable.  We refer to this rule as the Discover Bank rule. 
. . . . 
California courts have frequently applied this rule [that class action 
waivers in consumer contracts that limit consumer remedies are 
unconscionable] to find arbitration agreements unconscionable.395 
The Concepcion majority construed Discover Bank to be a restriction 
on arbitration rather than an unconscionability rule of which the AT&T 
arbitration agreement ran afoul.396  In doing so, it embraced the view of 
critics who had opposed this application of California unconscionability 
law.397  The Court observed that: 
The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 
4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to 
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.  Requiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental  
 
                                                          
 394. Id.  Other state supreme court cases are consistent with Armendariz and Discover Bank in 
finding some arbitration agreements unconscionable, not merely because they are arbitration 
agreements, but because of some other unfairness in the contracting process or the terms of the 
clause itself, such as lack of mutuality in the parties’ access to remedies.  See, e.g., Arnold v. United 
Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 997 
(Mont. 1999). 
Some scholars have criticized this approach.  See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Nonmutual 
Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 I. J. CORP. L. 537, 547 (2002); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward 
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186–87 (2004).  And it 
appears that most states do not find unconscionability from nonmutuality alone so long as there was 
sufficient consideration given to the party that lacks mutuality of remedies or procedural options.  
See Allyson K. Kennett, Case Notes, Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams: Show Me 
the Mutuality—A New Demand Based on an Old Doctrine Changes the Rules for Enforceability of 
Arbitration Agreements in Arkansas, 54 ARK. L. REV. 621, 631 (2001).  But regardless of which 
perspective is correct, it is unquestionable that the text of the Federal Arbitration Act itself places 
authority for making this determination in the hands of the state whose contract law governs the 
disputed arbitration clause.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 395. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 396. Id. at 1746–47. 
 397. See id. (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, supra note 394, at 186–87). 
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attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the 
FAA.398 
Beyond this formalistic but erroneous analysis—in error because it 
misread the statutory language and congressional intent and purpose as 
well as ignoring federalism concerns—the Concepcion majority could 
not resist displaying its infatuation for arbitration as a mode of dispute 
resolution differing from litigation.399  The opinion reads like an “Ode to 
Arbitration,”400 at least so long as the arbitration is bilateral, limited in 
scope, and not vested with too many of the leveling characteristics of 
litigation such as class treatment, liberal joinder of parties, and broad 
access to discovery.401 
In particular, the majority saw the California unconscionability law 
as a barrier that must be dismantled because arbitration works best when 
bilateral and “is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” by 
“increas[ing] risks to defendants.”402  Once again, the Court was 
embracing arbitration when it served the interests of the business 
establishment while also rebuking it as necessary to achieve the same 
end.  The Court was also embracing a view that class treatment of 
arbitration is so threatening to defendants as to unfairly coerce 
                                                          
 398. Id. at 1748. 
 399. See id. at 1748–49 (praising the efficiency of arbitration and generally supporting the Act). 
 400. See id. at 1748.  The Court stated: 
The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for 
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.  It can be specified, for 
example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings 
be kept confidential to protect trade secrets.  And the informality of arbitral proceedings 
is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution. 
Id. at 1749. 
 401. See id. at 1750–52.  The Court, in analyzing the pros and cons of arbitration, remarked: 
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different 
procedures and involving higher stakes.  Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  And 
while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the 
class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-
dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. . . . 
  First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of 
arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely 
to generate procedural morass than final judgment. . . . 
  Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. . . . 
  We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of 
these procedural requirements to an arbitrator. . . . 
  Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . 
  Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. 
Id. 
 402. See id. at 1751–52. 
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settlement.403  Although this has long been a rallying cry of forces 
opposing class actions, the most sophisticated scholarship on the topic 
has largely debunked this view as a canard.404 
In Concepcion, the dissenters reflect a stronger commitment to the 
standard rules of adjudication and a more realistic picture of the practical 
implications of the decision to which they object.  In the main, however, 
the dissenters are simply truer than the majority to both federalism 
concerns and legislative intent and purpose: 
The Discover Bank rule does not create a “blanket policy in 
California against class action waivers in the consumer context.”  
Instead, it represents the “application of a more general 
[unconscionability] principle.”  Courts applying California law have 
enforced class-action waivers where they satisfy general 
unconscionability standards.  And even when they fail, the parties 
remain free to devise other dispute mechanisms, including informal 
mechanisms, that, in context, will not prove unconscionable. 
The Discover Bank rule is consistent with the federal Act’s 
language. . . . 
The Discover Bank rule is also consistent with the basic “purpose 
behind” the Act. . . . 
Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide procedural 
and cost advantages. . . . 
But we have also cautioned against thinking that Congress’ 
primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural 
advantages.  Rather, that primary objective was to secure the 
“enforcement” of agreements to arbitrate. 
. . . . 
. . . [C]lass arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration.  It is a 
form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed 
elsewhere. . . . 
Where does the majority get its contrary idea—that individual, 
rather than class, arbitration is a “fundamental attribut[e]” of 
                                                          
 403. See id. at 1752 (“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be 
pressured into settling questionable claims.”). 
 404. See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359–60 (2003); Stempel, supra note 24, at 1128–29, 1227–30 (collecting 
literature debating the degree of coercive force in class actions). 
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arbitration?  The majority does not explain.  And it is unlikely to be 
able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute 
itself. 
. . . . 
The majority’s related claim that the Discover Bank rule will 
discourage the use of arbitration because “[a]rbitration is poorly suited 
to . . . higher stakes” lacks empirical support. . . . 
Further, even though contract defenses, e.g., duress and 
unconscionability, slow down the dispute resolution process, federal 
arbitration law normally leaves such matters to the States. . . . 
Because California applies the same legal principles to address the 
unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the 
unconscionability of any other contractual provision, the merits of class 
proceedings should not factor into our decision.  If California had 
applied its law of duress to void an arbitration agreement, would it 
matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement were efficient? 
. . . . 
Finally, the majority can find no meaningful support for its views 
in this Court’s precedent.  The federal Act has been in force for nearly a 
century.  We have decided dozens of cases about its requirements.  We 
have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures.  We 
have upheld nondiscriminating state laws that slow down arbitration 
proceedings.  But we have not, to my knowledge, applied the Act to 
strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial 
and administrative proceedings. 
At the same time, we have repeatedly referred to the Act’s basic 
objective as assuring that courts treat arbitration agreements “like all 
other contracts.”  And we have recognized that “[t]o immunize an 
arbitration agreement from judicial challenge” on grounds applicable to 
all other contracts “would be to elevate it over other forms of 
contract.”405 
The dissenters, like the majority, also could not resist a public policy 
argument.  But at least the public policy of the dissenters recognizes the 
realities of small claims practice and the potential for class treatment to 
level the playing field upon which larger, wealthier, repeat-player 
institutional litigants contend with largely unorganized individuals of 
                                                          
 405. Id. at 1757–61 (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
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modest means.406  More important in terms of the mainstream rules of 
jurisprudence, the dissent reflects the type of respect for traditional state 
contract law prerogatives reflected in the text of the Act and its 
legislative history: 
 What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the 
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a 
$30.22 claim?  In California’s perfectly rational view, nonclass 
arbitration over such sums will also sometimes have the effect of 
depriving claimants of their claims (say, for example, where claiming 
the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms that require technical 
legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on 
hold).  Discover Bank sets forth circumstances in which the California 
courts believe that the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated 
to insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds by 
“deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”  Why is this kind of decision—weighing the 
pros and cons of all class proceedings alike—not California’s to 
make?407 
Emphasizing the advantages of their legislative intent and purpose 
argument, the dissenters noted that Congress was quite clear that in 
passing the Act: it focused on merchants acting “under the customs of 
their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent 
bargaining power.”408 
Although the dissent hews considerably closer to mainstream 
approaches to statutory construction and to the text and legislative intent 
of the Act than does the majority, the majority was able to put together 
an argument based on precedent because the Court’s arbitration decisions 
of the prior thirty years had steadily moved away from fidelity to 
statutory text, legislative intent, the purpose of the Act, and concern for 
values of consent and fairness in contracting. 
While lacking much support in the Act’s text or legislative 
background,409 the Concepcion majority was nonetheless able to put 
                                                          
 406. See id. 
 407. Id. at 1761 (citations omitted). 
 408. See id. at 1759 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 646 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); J. Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the 
Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9–10 (1923); Press Release, Dep’t 
of Commerce, Secretary Hoover Favors Arbitration (Dec. 28, 1925) (on file with the Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 
VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926)). 
 409. The Concepcion majority’s efforts to support its holding based on modern Court precedent 
is rather well done, presuming one reads the majority’s selective summary and quotation of 
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together a plausible attack on California’s approach to unconscionability 
analysis of arbitration agreements based on decades of case law that had 
gradually undermined these mainstream bases for construing the Act.410  
Brick by brick, the Court had erected an edifice of arbitration quite 
different than Congress intended.  Through relatively steady incremental 
“slouching” away from the core of the original Act and “bootstrapping” 
upon the rhetorical excesses of each case expanding the Act and 
diminishing controls on mandated mass arbitration,411 the Court by 2011 
had effectively judicially rewritten the Act into something fitting the 
majority’s policy preferences. 
Incredibly, the Concepcion majority was horrified at the prospect of 
class-wide administration of arbitration but saw no problems with the 
world of mass, mandatory arbitration the Court had created over the past 
                                                                                                                       
precedent in a vacuum divorced from the actual background history of the Act and the Court’s first 
fifty years of adjudicating disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The majority’s direct contact 
with the background of the statute, however, takes on an almost ludicrous tone.  For example, the 
majority criticizes the dissent’s assessment of the statute as focused on commercial arbitration 
among merchants as “[r]elying upon nothing more indicative of congressional understanding than 
statements of witnesses in committee hearings and a press release of Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover.”  Id. at 1749 n.5. 
This is a little unfair to the dissent, which implicitly considers the entire background of the Act 
even if it only quotes certain material and grossly mischaracterizes the full genesis of the Act.  
Scholars investigating the Act have agreed with the dissent’s viewpoint that the enacting Congress 
envisioned an Act specifically enforcing the type of arbitration agreements found in merchants’ 
commercial contracts of the time and not the type of mandated mass consumer arbitration at issue in 
Concepcion.  See HUBER & WESTON, supra note 104, at 9–11 (providing background on the 
derivation of the Act); Stempel, supra note 104, at 277–82; see also 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & 
STIPANOWICH, supra note 240 §§ 8:1–8:2 (reviewing the Act’s background and legislative history). 
 410. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1749 (asserting that the Act reflects “‘a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies 
to the contrary’” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983))); id. at 1747 (stating that “a court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable’” (quoting 
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987))); id. at 1748 (noting that “[t]he ‘principal purpose’ 
of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms’” 
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989))); id. at 1749 (“Contrary to the dissent’s view, our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA 
was designed to promote arbitration.  They have repeatedly described the Act as ‘embod[ying] [a] 
national policy favoring arbitration’ . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))); id. (stating that requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies prior to arbitration frustrates the purpose of the Act and “‘hinder[s] speedy 
resolution of the controversy’” (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008))); id. at 
1750–51 (criticizing class treatment of disputes as inconsistent with the Act (citing Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds, Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–76 (2010))); id. at 1753 (stating that the 
California contract doctrine of unconscionability “‘stands as obstacle to the . . . purposes and 
objectives of Congress’” expressed in the Act (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941))). 
 411. See Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching, supra note 11. 
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three decades.412  One might ascribe this to jurisprudential myopia, but it 
seems more likely that the Concepcion majority disliked the former 
because of its leveling effect between the more and less powerful 
disputants but embraced the latter because of its inequality-enhancing 
traits.  The arbitration decisions of the Roberts Court line up too neatly in 
favor of the economically and politically more powerful disputants to be 
the product of mere inadvertence. 
The Concepcion majority was so intent on striking down California’s 
use of the authority provided in section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
that it exhibited a truly embarrassing moment of judicial amnesia.  After 
criticizing California’s Discover Bank doctrine of unconscionability as 
unduly targeted against arbitration, the Concepcion majority observed 
that “[o]f course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns 
that attend contracts of adhesion—for example, requiring class-action-
waiver provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be 
highlighted.”413  The problem, of course, is that the Court prohibited just 
this type of state disclosure statute in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto.414  The Montana law struck down in Casarotto required that 
arbitration provisions in franchise contracts be noted in underlined 
capital letters.415  That actual state law pretty closely resembles the 
hypothetical state disclosure law suggested by the Concepcion Court as 
an acceptable policing alternative to Discover Bank’s unconscionability 
doctrine.  If anything, the Montana statute would seem less of a 
disclosure burden than highlighting class action waiver provisions as 
suggested by the Concepcion majority.416 
                                                          
 412. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746–53 (citing case law from 1983 to 2006 in support of its 
decision). 
 413. See id. at 1750 n.6. 
 414. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 415. See id. at 683.  The Montana law provided that that “[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to 
arbitration . . . [shall be] typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.”  Id. 
(first alteration in original) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)   An arbitration clause not meeting this provision was rendered unenforceable under 
Montana law.  Id. at 684. 
 416. Note 6 of Concepcion is unclear regarding whether a state could make the violation of an 
apparently permissible state statute requiring the highlighting of a class action waiver grounds for 
refusing to enforce the arbitration clause or the class action limitations of the clause.  See 131 S. Ct. 
at 1750 n.6.  Such was the penalty in Montana for violation of the arbitration disclosure provision at 
issue in Casarotto.  States frequently refuse to enforce contract terms where there have been 
violations of disclosure requirements.  But reading Casarotto as a whole suggests the Court was 
concerned that not only was the required disclosure singling out and burdening arbitration, but that 
the statute had an excessively draconian penalty for failing to provide the required disclosure that the 
contract contained an arbitration clause.  See 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may not, however, invalidate 
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Was the Concepcion majority unaware of Casarotto, a decision only 
fifteen years old that involved four members of the Concepcion Court, 
three in the majority?417  Impossible.  The same Concepcion majority 
suggesting that states respond to its holding with legislation similar to 
that struck down in Casarotto had just cited Casaratto a mere four pages 
earlier concerning the types of state contract rules that fell within the 
purview of section 2 of the Act.418 
But being aware of a precedent and appreciating its meaning are two 
different things.  A Court with its wits about it would at least have 
addressed the inconsistency of Concepcion note 6 and Casarotto.  But 
the Concepcion majority failed to do so, and the Concepcion dissent did 
not address this error by the majority.419  One can make attempts to 
distinguish Casarotto and Concepcion, but any attempted distinction 
seems doomed to unpersuasiveness.420  How can a requirement of 
minimally adequate disclosure of arbitration in a franchise agreement 
violate the Act while a requirement of forced disclosure of the limitations 
on class actions in an arbitration clause complies with the Act?421 
  
                                                                                                                       
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.” (citation omitted)); 
id. at 687–88 (highlighting the Court’s concern over state laws which invalidate arbitration clauses 
in general); see also supra notes 311–15 and accompanying text. 
 417. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer were all members of both the 
Casarotto Court and the Concepcion Court.  Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1743. 
 418. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (“This saving clause [of section 2 of the Act] permits 
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their 
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 
687)). 
 419. The Concepcion dissent cited Casarotto only in passing in a string citation for the 
proposition that that Court’s precedents “have repeatedly referred to the Act’s basic objective as 
assuring that courts treat arbitration agreements ‘like all other contracts.’”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1761 (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (gathering cases). 
 420. See Concepcion, 131 U.S. at 1750 n.6 (majority opinion).  One sentence after inviting 
California to consider legislation similar to the Montana statute struck down in Casarotto, the Court 
cautioned that “[s]uch steps cannot, however, conflict with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure 
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.”  Id.  Trying to be fair to 
the majority, one could seize upon this last sentence as a means of distinguishing Casarotto from the 
type of hypothetical state disclosure legislation that the Concepcion majority appears to be 
suggesting as a substitute for the Discover Bank approach to unconscionability.  But, a reasonably 
neutral observer could not regard such a proffered distinction as persuasive. 
 421. If the Concepcion Court meant what it wrote in note 6, then the type of state disclosure 
regulation seemingly approved therein could significantly mitigate the potential unfairness of 
mandatory mass arbitration.  In light of Concepcion’s seeming obliviousness to the conflict between 
note 6 and Casarotto, however, state legislatures will probably be reluctant to follow the Court’s 
suggestion. 
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas stakes out a strained 
position, one that is particularly surprising coming from the Justice who 
had until recently continued to argue that Southland was wrongly 
decided and that the Federal Act did not apply in state court.422  
According to Justice Thomas, Discover Bank’s brand of 
unconscionability could not thwart the arbitration sought by AT&T 
because it “does not relate to defects in the making of the agreement.”423  
Surely this view is incorrect, because section 2 of the Act speaks of any 
contract doctrine that relates to revocation.  A contract can be revocable 
for infirmities other than those going directly to the contracting process. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUATION OF THE AFFAIR 
Looking back on nearly thirty years of Supreme Court affection for 
arbitration, the record is not a particularly attractive one for proponents 
of the rule of law or fans of constrained judging that does not unduly 
reflect the personal political, social, economic, and ideological 
preferences of the bench. 
For the most part, the Court has been caught up in the same 
uncritical support for arbitration that society has shown during the same 
time period.  Business is in vogue while government is out of favor.424  
Litigation is considered wasteful while private ordering is revered.425  
                                                          
 422. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 
333 (discussing Justice Thomas’s traditional view that the Federal Arbitration Act governed actions 
in federal court but did not set forth substantive law applicable in state court). 
 423. See id. 
 424. See JEFF MADRICK, THE CASE FOR BIG GOVERNMENT 1 (2009) (“It is conventional wisdom 
in America today that high levels of taxes and government spending diminish America’s prosperity.  
The claim strikes a deep intuitive chord, not only among those on the Right, but also among many on 
today’s Left.  It has become so obvious to so many over the last thirty years, it hardly seems to 
require demonstration any longer.  It is apparently so widely accepted by the public and rolls off the 
tongues of policymakers from both parties with such fluency that one would think the evidence 
needn’t even be gathered.”); Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Faith in Government Plummets, Research 
Says, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at 6 (“The public’s faith in government has dropped sharply around 
the world in the past year, giving businesses a rare opportunity to seize the global agenda . . . .  [I]n 
every country, government leaders were more distrusted than business chiefs.”); Elizabeth Mendes, 
In U.S., Fear of Big Government at Near-Record Level, GALLUP.COM (Dec. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/151490/fear-big-government-near-record-level.aspx (“Two in three 
Americans (64%) say big government will be the biggest threat to the country, one percentage point 
lower than the record high, and more than twice the number who say the same about big business 
(26%).”). 
 425. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1266–67 (2005) (“Starting in the 1970s, large sections of business embraced 
beliefs and prescriptions about the legal system that, for want of a name, I have called the ‘jaundiced 
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Arbitration is enforced even under circumstances where reasonable 
persons might wonder about the degree of assent to boilerplate 
arbitration clauses in standardized contracts of adhesion. 
Courts—particularly the Supreme Court—have tended to view 
arbitration as if it were still the type of guild-like expert resolution 
among merchants that animated support for the 1925 Federal Act while 
ignoring the degree to which post-Southland forms of mass consumer 
arbitration have moved far away from the original congressional intent 
and purpose.  But to a large degree, the Court, when dealing with 
arbitration, has refused to bind itself to the type of textualism and 
originalism it ordinarily embraces in matters of statutory construction. 
The Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence imposed a judicial 
evolution of the Act in which the statute morphed from one shielding the 
commercial contracts of merchants from overt judicial hostility into a 
statute allegedly enshrining a “liberal” and “national policy” in favor of 
arbitration so strong that—in spite of the language of section 2 of the 
Act—state contract law regulating the arbitration contracting process is 
largely preempted by the Act, even when applied to a variety of 
mandatory mass arbitration far afield from the dispute resolution 
envisioned by the enacting Congress. 
In the process, the Court has been willing to ignore seemingly clear 
statutory text favorable to workers resisting mandatory arbitration of job-
related disputes and to view traditional state contract regulation as some  
                                                                                                                       
view.’  By this I refer to the view that America is enmeshed in a ‘litigation explosion’ that is 
unraveling the nation’s social fabric and undermining the economy. . . .  In the jaundiced view, trials 
are not only expensive, but risky because juries are arbitrary, sentimental, and ‘out of control.’  This 
view reinforces strategies of settlement to avoid trial.”)  According to Galanter, “[w]hile confidence 
in adjudication and courts has declined, the courts, politicians, and business elites have embraced 
ADR.”  Id. at 1268; accord, Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984–85 (2003) (“Critics maintain that excessive and 
frivolous litigation overwhelms the judicial system’s capacity to administer speedy and efficient 
justice, leads to higher costs for litigants and society at large, and even hinders America’s 
competitive position in the global economy. . . . Civil litigation has long been criticized as costly and 
inefficient.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the 
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 475 (2004) (“Critics of the current system 
frequently present alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as an all-purpose prescription.”). 
Anti-litigation sentiment has been in ascendency for some time.  See Marc Galanter, The Day 
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5 (1986) (“A phalanx of mournful and indignant 
commentators concur that America is in the throes of a litigation crisis requiring urgent attention 
from policymakers.”); see also WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 2 (1991) 
(describing the “unleashing of litigation” that “clogs and jams the gears of commerce, sowing 
friction and distrust between the productive enterprises on which material progress depends and all 
who buy their products, work at their plants and offices, join in their undertakings”). 
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sort of insurgency threatening federal power and the core of U.S. 
business. 
This kind of adjudication is far removed from the traditional judicial 
commitment to fair reading of the text, close attention to legislative 
intent and purpose, and respect for traditional state authority.  Even 
without considering the practical David versus Goliath aspects of many 
arbitration disputes and the practical consequences of enforced private 
ordering, the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has been so disappointing 
as to suggest undue infatuation with arbitration. 
But in selected cases, the Court has been willing to disparage at least 
some aspects of some arbitrations,426 when necessary to prevent it from 
benefitting consumers or less powerful commercial actors.  The Court 
has also been willing to permit mass-contract drafters wide latitude to 
arrogate to the arbitrator the traditional judicial role of assessing whether 
an arbitration agreement even covers the parties’ dispute427 but has been 
unwilling to permit contracting parties to agree to subject arbitration 
awards to more searching scrutiny than provided by section 10.428 
Perhaps the Court loves some things—for example, litigants with 
more money, power, or leverage—even more than it admires arbitration.  
Or perhaps it hates some things—for example, class actions, consumer 
demands, assertion of “anti-business” remedial legislation or common 
law—enough to restrict arbitration in some cases.  But neither of these 
reasons provides any better justification for the Court’s disappointing 
case law about arbitration than the Court’s demonstrated infatuation with 
the arbitration mechanism. 
True to this depressing form, the Court ushered in 2012 with yet 
another poorly reasoned valentine to arbitration in CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, holding that “right to sue” and non-waiver provisions of the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA)429 did not preclude 
enforcement of a boilerplate mass arbitration clause.430  Distressingly, 
only Justice Ginsburg dissented,431 although Justices Sotomayor and 
                                                          
 426. See supra text accompanying notes 355–74 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen and class-wide 
resolution of claims). 
 427. See supra text accompanying notes 375–85 (discussing Rent-A-Center and the expansion of 
arbitrators’ authority). 
 428. See supra text accompanying notes 349–53 (discussing Hall Street and the inability of a 
contract to expand the scope of judicial scrutiny of arbitrations). 
 429. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 430. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–71 (2012). 
 431. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Kagan in concurring opinions viewed the issue as “a much closer case 
than the majority opinion suggests.”432 
CROA, passed in 1996, responded to a perceived problem of abusive 
lending and was designed to protect consumers dealing with “credit 
repair” lenders, in particular credit card companies that issued low-limit 
credit cards to persons with poor credit history.433  The limited options 
and sophistication of these bad-credit-risk consumers logically made 
them particularly vulnerable to predatory lending agreements.434 
CompuCredit itself provided an almost textbook example of the 
potential for abuse of such credit card issuance.  Plaintiff Greenwood 
was issued an “Aspire Visa” credit card marketed by CompuCredit and 
issued by a bank.435  Greenwood’s complaint alleged that: 
CompuCredit’s promotional materials told potential customers that no 
deposit would be required, and that cardholders would receive, upfront, 
a credit line of $300.  In fact, plaintiffs asserted, they were charged an 
initial finance fee of $29, a monthly fee of $6.50, and an annual fee of 
$150, assessed immediately against the $300 limit. In the aggregate, 
Plaintiffs calculated, fees charged the first year amounted to $257.436 
When Greenwood sued and sought class action treatment of the case, she 
was confronted with the broad-based arbitration clause used in an 
“enclosed insert” to the application materials, which provided for 
arbitration before the controversial National Arbitration Forum (NAF) 
that has since been forced from this segment of the arbitration market by 
a state attorney general’s action.437 
CROA mandates certain disclosures by card marketers such as 
CompuCredit, including a statement to the consumer that “[y]ou have a 
right to sue”438 and also makes void “[a]ny waiver by any consumer of 
any protection provided by or any right of the consumer” under the 
law.439  Continuing the Court’s departure from the normal rules of 
statutory construction when faced with a challenge to arbitration, the 
                                                          
 432. Id. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 433. See Andrew T. Schwenk, A Beast of Burden Without Any Reins, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 
1180–81 (2011). 
 434. See id. 
 435. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 667. 
 436. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 437. See id. at 677 nn.1–2; supra note 102 (discussing the NAF’s settlement with the Minnesota 
Attorney General). 
 438. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006). 
 439. See § 1679f. 
STEMPEL FINAL.docx 8/2/2012  11:31 AM 
2012] TAINTED LOVE 887 
Court ruled that the “right to sue” disclosure did not literally mean what 
it said and meant only a right to make a claim—which could in turn be 
subject to a forum selection clause like an arbitration agreement, even 
one found in a package insert to an adhesion contract designating a 
tribunal thought by many to be stacked against consumers.440 
Only a half-year after its controversial and much-criticized 5–4 split 
in Concepcion,441 the Court returned with a vengeance to supporting 
arbitration, even in the face of seemingly contrary statutory directives 
and problematic “consent” to an arbitration provision that severely 
limited the opportunity for vindication of small claims.  But perhaps even 
worse, the Court’s latest embrace of arbitration spurred only one 
dissenting vote.442  However tainted, the Court’s love for arbitration 
continues unabated. 
                                                          
 440. See 131 S. Ct. at 669–70.  The majority attempted to bolster its argument by noting that 
Congress has in other instances used more express language precluding arbitration and posited that, 
by 1996, Congress was well aware of concerns about mandatory arbitration.  See id. at 672 (majority 
opinion) (citing Ware, supra note 315). 
The majority also relied on cases that refused to apply a “statutory exception” to arbitration, 
id., but none of the statutes involved in those cases contained nonwaiver provisions, a point well 
made by the dissent.  See id. at 679 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 441. Battles continue over Concepcion.  See Scott Graham, AT&T Mobility Doesn’t Apply in the 
Workplace, Says NLRB, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 9, 2012, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/ 
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202537751118 (“NLRB member Craig Becker joined chairman Mark Gaston 
Pearce (both Obama appointees to the Board) to hold that class action waivers don’t belong in the 
workplace, and that requiring them as a condition of employment is an unfair labor practice.  The 
Board’s sole Republican member, Brian Hayes, was recused for undisclosed reasons.”). 
 442. Media reports of the CompuCredit decision not only portrayed the vote as lopsided and the 
result as uncontroversial, but they generally failed to discuss Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting rationale 
and counter statement regarding statutory text, structure, and purpose.  See, e.g., Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Supreme Court Upholds Arbitration Provision in Credit Card Contract, A.B.A. J., Jan. 10, 
2012, available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_upholds_arbitration_ 
provision_in_credit_card_contract (reporting that Justice “Ginsburg was the only dissenter”); 
Supreme Court Upholds Credit Card Arbitration Clauses, INS. J., Jan. 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/01/12/230946.htm (same). 
